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Abstract 
Beginning with a survey of the shortcoming of theories of organology/media-
as-externalization of mind/body—a philosophical-anthropological tradition 
that stretches from Plato through Ernst Kapp and finds its contemporary 
proponent in Bernard Stiegler—I propose that the phenomenological 
treatment of media as an outpouching and extension of mind qua intentionality 
is not sufficient to counter the ‗black-box‘ mystification of today‘s deep 
learning‘s algorithms. Focusing on a close study of Simondon‘s On the Existence 
of Technical Objects and Individuation, I argue that the process-philosophical work 
of Gilbert Simondon, with its critique of Norbert Wiener‘s first-order 
cybernetics, offers a precursor to the conception of second-order cybernetics 
(as endorsed by Francisco Varela, Humberto Maturana, and Ricardo B. Uribe) 
and, specifically, its autopoietic treatment of information. It has been argued by 
those such as Frank Pasquale that neuro-inferential deep learning systems 
premised on predictive patterning, such as AlphaGo Zero, have a veiled logic 
and, thus, are ‗black boxes‘. In detailing a philosophical-historical approach to 
demystify predictive patterning/processing and the logic of such deep learning 
algorithms, this paper attempts to shine a light on such systems and their inner 
workings à la Simondon. 
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This article was penned shortly before Bernard Stiegler passed and was constructed after a series of 
exchanges between myself and Stiegler. Although the article seeks to problematize some of Stiegler’s 
thought regarding the philosophy of technology, specifically in regards to his theorizing neural 
networks and deep learning, I ought to underscore that Stiegler was a mentor and friend who always 
encouraged my debating and challenging his work. Thus, this article is dedicated to the life and 
memory of Bernard. 
 
Introduction: Media as Externalization  
The philosopher of media Bernard Stiegler is one of the most recent thinkers to 
propose that media objects are the externalization of something more primal and 
transcendental, whether it be intention, language, or cognition. Stiegler considers that 
the implications of the Promethean program, where collective self-mastery and active 
participation are imbricated within the remaking of mankind in the world, has 
become exacerbated in the era of digital technologies and networks. Stiegler‘s 
normatively negative position—violently poised against the possibility of a 
transhumanist telos of further enlightenment—is perhaps what distinguishes him 
most from the philosophical genealogy of technicity. Before proceeding with a 
critique of Stiegler, however, we must first contextualize that his thought does not 
exist in a vacuum and that his is only the most recent instantiation within a rich 
history of philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of technology that sees the 
human as a ‗not-yet-finished‘ creature capable of developing itself by way of self-
constituting prostheses—linguistic/semantic and technological—artificializing its 
environment and automating its ecology. Russian philosopher Nikolai Fedorov, an 
early champion of radical life extension and a precursor of transhumanism, identified 
this same deficiency as what moors mankind to the creative drive, the impetus to 
explore foreign lands and celestial spaces with the index of domination in mind. 
Musing on the history of human invention and reinvention, Fedorov remarks that:  
the spread of humanity over the planet was accompanied by the creation 
of new (artificial) organs and coverings. The purpose of humanity is to 
change all that is natural, a free gift of nature, into what is created by 
work. Outer space, expansion beyond the limits of the planet, demands 
precisely such radical change. The great feat of courage now confronting 
humanity requires the highest martial virtues such as daring and self-
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sacrifice, while excluding that which is most horrible in war—taking the 
lives of people like oneself (Fedorov, 1990: 96). 
For Fedorov, this ‗underdetermination‘ of overspecialization, the Promethean 
anthropological-philosophical treatise, grants a level of behavioral leeway and 
cognitive lability to mankind.1 On one hand, Stiegler follows from this tradition, for 
he sees such invention as inexorable from the human project but, on the other hand, 
Stiegler also argues that there are catastrophic implications riddling its most recent 
actualization in the realm of ‗the digital‘ (or what he calls ‗digital tertiary retentions‘). 
For Stiegler, digital reinvention is steeped with the phenomenological erasure of 
creative technical activity, where technē is no longer the project of human rationality2 
but the engine of positive feedback loops that overdetermine and undercut creativity, 
forecasting mankind‘s future into anomie and isolation. Such is the murmur of 
Stiegler‘s techno-pessimism.3  
Stiegler‘s fatalistic treatment thus recalls what Friedrich Kittler perhaps all too 
dismissively denounced as the ‗old thesis‘ of media—the understanding of media 
artefacts as extensions of human systems/organs.4 Yet this ‗old thesis‘ is not merely 
5relegated to media theorists such as Stiegler nor obscure transhumanist thinkers 
such as Fedorov. In fact, it finds its philosophical roots in the birth of philosophy, 
which arguably spouts forth from the consideration of the human organism as the 
inheritor of lack: a remainder that is underdetermined, underspecialized, and 
underdeveloped physiologically and adaptively.6 This ‗lack‘, the posthumanism that 
haunts the human project, is precisely what innumerable philosophers have argued 
motivates mankind‘s invention of artificial technologies, artefacts, and languages, 
systematizing a recursive scaffolding of self-reference and development.  
This rendering has a long lineage beginning with Plato‘s Meno. In the Meno, Socrates 
insists that one can know nothing of virtue intrinsically and that knowledge 
transpires dialectically, a byproduct of dialogue and interrogation vis-à-vis sociability 
and deduction. For Socrates, knowledge is an offspring of the nature of virtue 
revealing itself. Consequently, Socrates calls upon an uneducated slave from Meno‘s 
retinue, querying whether this boy knows how to calculate the double of the area of a 
square. As the boy draws a square in the sand, followed by diagonal lines, Socrates 
claims that the slave ‗spontaneously‘ recovers the solution to this problem. 
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Exteriorizing the calculation, technesis involves the synthesis of the hypomnesic 
inscription within the inorganic domain (the sand), which results in the recursive 
logic of recollection—mechanical reproduction invites knowledge into a dance with 
artificially reconstructed memory. 7  Socrates, noting how knowledge springs forth 
from the inscribed calculation concludes by noting: 
Meno, can you see where our friend here has got to on his journey 
towards recollection? At first, he didn‘t know which line would produce 
the figure with an area of 8 square feet––just as he doesn‘t yet know the 
answer now either; but he still thought he knew the answer then, and he 
was answering confidently, as if he had knowledge. He didn‘t think he 
was stuck before, but now he appreciates that he is stuck and he also 
doesn‘t think he knows what in fact he doesn‘t know (Waterfield, 2005: 
84a-84b, 120). 
The Socratic elenchus here asserts that the correct process of questioning (by oneself 
or an external agent) elicits the recollection of relevant truths and is markedly 
dialectical—that is, despite the fact that it is Socrates who proposes the definitions or 
ideas for discourse, he does not examine them or grant them truth-value until he 
gains a measure of agreement from his interlocutor (in this case the slave-boy and 
Meno). In the Meno, this process is synthesized by way of the inscribed formula, 
finding its nexus in artefaction. The formulation of artefaction, as the offspring of a 
dialectical intellectual process, is normatively positive 8 —occupying the space of 
calculation-cum-inscription, that provides for recollection of that which was 
dormant: knowledge, which becomes prosthetic. The Hegelian philosopher of 
technology Ernst Kapp (1808-1896) called this process ‗organ-projection‘, German 
anthropologist Paul Alsberg (1883-1965) termed it ‗body-liberation‘, mathematician 
Alfred J. Lotka (1880-1949) deemed it ‗exosomatic evolution‘,9 and André Leroi-
Gourhan (1911-1986) called it ‗exteriorization‘. Despite the various verbiage, the 
central principle remains the same: the human and its function(s) becomes 
delaminated from any particularized specializations and adaptations, such that 
mankind configures an existence for itself by way of inventing technologies. In doing 
so, mankind externalizes its bodily functions, automating its means of survival by 
way of artificializing its environment so as to supplement its biotic deficiency. 
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For the sake of this paper, we will focus on the recursive logic at play here, and thus 
limit ourselves to two strands of thought: dialectical and non-dialectical. The first 
camp ensnares a collective of dialectically-minded philosophers, who—reaffirming 
the humanist Hegelian project of the Dasein of Geist as progressing via an asymptotic 
telos—imply that technological evolution is necessarily carved around lines of 
succession, wherein ‗technological progression‘ finds itself always countered by the 
intervention of negativity. In addition to Kapp, Alsberg, Lotka, and Leroi-Gourhan 
this genealogy includes Alfred Espinas (1844-1922), Georges Canguilhem (1904-
1995), Arnold Gehlen (1904-1976), Heinrich Popitz (1925-2002), Raymond Ruyer 
(1902-1987), Bernard Stiegler (1952-2020), and Marc Azéma (b. 1967),10 many of 
whom are often regarded as philosophers of ‗organology‘. Before more closely 
examining the Hegelian core of this project, let us clarify what, exactly, being a 
thinker of organology entails, as it invokes a particular conception of reflective 
thought that recalls a central pillar of the first-order cybernetics of Wiener, 
McCulloch, and Shannon: positive feedback within a closed system. This is an 
important schema to keep in play as we review the Hegelian notion of self-
externalization. 
 
Organology 
‗Organology‘, as a philosophical system, concerns itself with how recursive forms 
occur in nature and, thus, has an inherent ecological penchant. It invokes an 
epistemological and differential rendering of synthetic division—that which is 
inorganic is differentiated from that which is organic, such that one can direct the 
reflective judgment towards the object of thought, deracinating consciousness from 
the object of consciousness. Organology is a synthetic thought ‗that not only 
integrates but also searches for a new epistemology that creates a new loop‘ (Hui, 
2019: 25). As evidenced by the 1947 paper ‗Machine and Organism‘, Canguilhem was 
the first thinker to use the term ‗organology‘;11 in refusing the mechanist purview, 
Canguilhem purposed this term in order to consider the relation between organism 
and machine within a dialectical purview while reverting the Cartesian epistemology 
(of mechanizing life). Where, according to Descartes, the body and its movements 
are governed by mechanical rules, for Canguilhem they are governed by something 
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far more fundamental and primary—an exigent vitalism that is always translated by 
way of representeds. Canguilhem rejected the parallelism between organisms and 
machines—organisms are not necessarily adaptive and, thus, can display pathological 
behaviors; machines (specifically, Canguilhem seems to have had the automata of 
first-order cybernetics in mind) on the other hand, are guided by a telos—fixed pre-
programmed goals. Where organisms are able to self-organize and self-repair, 
machines cannot repurpose their goals, programs, or directives; Canguilhem remarks 
that ‗[i]t can easily be said that there is more purpose in the machine than in the 
organism, because the purpose of the machine is rigid, univocal, univalent. A 
machine cannot replace another machine‘ (2008: 89). Although this was not 
necessarily the case, as Norbert Wiener‘s work on homeostasis and adaptive response 
was formulated around the concepts of emergency, error, and shock (modelled 
around Walter Bradford Cannon‘s work on fight-or-flight response), 12  for 
Canguilhem—and the philosophy of organology thereafter—science and technology 
are understood to be circular, with the body and its nomological laws reinforcing 
something more primary: life.13 This gives a clue as to why, exactly, Canguilhem‘s 
‗organology‘, and, in turn, the project of organology writ large is dialectical. Rather 
than constituting a supersensible world, the nomological laws of nature are 
understood as making explicit something that is implicit already in ordinary empirical 
descriptions of how things are.  
Canguilhem‘s rethinking does not reduce the machine as the equivalent of the human 
but, instead, conceives of the human-machine as an organic whole, set into dialectical 
motion. Canguilhem‘s conception was inspired by many other thinkers, including 
Kurt Goldstein and his theory of holism, the exteriorization theory of Leroi-
Gourhan,14 and Kapp‘s organprojektion.15 Organology finds its most markedly Hegelian 
articulation with Kapp, who coined the phrase ‗philosophy of technology‘ in 1877. 
Kapp was a Hegelian philosopher true and true, whose work sought to demonstrate 
technics as the synthesized projection of organs, tools understood as biophysical 
hardware, with the ineluctable human canalizing itself by way of its technology. For 
Kapp such tools mechanically reconstruct organic form, serving as indices of 
morphological residue. As a Hegelian, Kapp‘s image of thought finds the human 
(and the human project) reasserting its primacy, entailed in dialectical becoming. 
Kapp‘s understanding of the tool illustrates the Hegelian core of media-as-
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externalization, wherefore the universal and singular forms are entangled in totality, 
each containing the determination of the other within it and, thus, the two are 
wrapped into absolutely one totality, their oneness the diremption of itself in the free 
reflective shine of this duality. 16  Having now reviewed organology, let us now 
implore this Hegelian core. 
Spirit, the Rational Object, and Definite Conception 
In Hegel‘s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), the notion ‗alienation‘ is moored to two 
German terms that Hegel utilizes: ‗Entfremdung‘ and ‗Entäusserung‘. Although both 
have often been translated as ‗alienation‘, in parsing this heteronomy with a 
sharpened conceptual scalpel at hand we ought to note that ‗Entfremdung‘ more 
closely refers to estrangement as the process or state whereby consciousness is 
separated from one or more of the aspects required for consciousness to fully 
understand itself. ‗Entäusserung‘, on the other hand, is the process where 
consciousness externalizes itself in an object-ified form and, by way of the object, 
develops a more adequate understanding of itself. The former is linked to alienation 
and the latter artefaction, as (self)-externalization is the way consciousness learns that it 
is not purely a subject and has an ontological structure that not only incorporates a 
relation to objectivity but depends on this relation. In turn, consciousness is purposed 
and re-purposed, deracinated from the subject as it is distributed among a 
community in the form of concrete content—instrumentalized vide the form of 
work and the objects of labor. Thinking, the profoundest aspect of Spirit with its 
highest activity being to comprehend itself, unspools by way of its operations, which 
direct themselves towards determinate activity, the aims of finitude. Thus, we see 
how cognitive activity is directed not towards interiority but a determinate actuality. 
For Hegel, the nature of Spirit must particularize itself to become true and this is 
achieved by way of movement towards externalization: ―consciousness is essentially 
this process—not a remaining static in the immediate natural state but a passage 
through a process in which what is eternal or true, as its essence, becomes its object 
or purpose‖ (Hegel, 1990: 21). 
For Hegel, the activity of object-ification transfers and converts empty objectivity into a 
manifestation of being in-and-for itself, i.e., self-determination. For ―[a]s soon as the 
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universal is externalised, it takes on a particular character. In isolation, the inward 
dimension of the Idea would remain a lifeless abstraction, and it is only by means of 
activity that it acquires real existence‖ (Hegel, 1975: 79). Spirit abandons its original 
condition and discovers itself through what it performs, translating inner essence 
into reality by way of externalizing the universal concept and, thus, attaining a ‗real‘ 
existence. For Hegel customs, laws, institutions, and symbols of ancient nations were 
vessels of speculative ideas and products of Spirit but the true fruit of Spirit never 
comes first; the speculative Idea is externalized, it is always the manifestation point of 
rationality upon worldly existence, where the potentiality in consciousness, volition, 
and action finds itself inorganically excised through its determinate object. Spirit, for 
Hegel, is not abstract, because ―it is consciousness, but it is also the object of 
consciousness—for it is in the nature of the spirit to have itself as its object. The 
spirit, then, is capable of thought, and its thought is that of a being which itself 
exists, and which thinks that it exists and how it exists‖ (Hegel, 1990: 45) 
Ray Brassier, in a recent conference chaired by Paul B. Preciado titled ―The 
Parliament of Bodies: Communism will be the collective management of alienation‖ asks 
whether this heteronomy between ‗Entfremdung‘ and ‗Entaüsserung‘ implies synonymy? 
Spirit‘s self-externalization—that is, collective self-consciousness‘ self-
externalization—is undoubtedly constitutive, but there is a marked difference between 
how Spirit realizes its freedom and those ways by which it becomes bound or subjected to a 
foreign agency or power, which is only, itself, an alienated or estranged form. That is, 
following Brassier‘s account, all estrangement is externalization but not all 
externalization is estrangement. Drawing from Adorno‘s reading of Hegel, Brassier 
proffers that this account evidences the dialectical interplay between Spirit‘s 
independence and dependence, wherefore Spirit frees itself form its subjection to 
nature, achieving spiritual independence/autonomy, and in doing so moves towards 
culture as a kind of ―second nature‖ to which it then becomes subjected. It becomes 
dependent on societal institutions, customs, and norms in a manner by which Spirit‘s 
freedom is significantly diminished. At once, naturalness or instinct is replicated 
within Spirit, manifesting within it in an estranged form while, institutions, customs, 
and norms begin to function as if they were nature. The anthropologist Arnold 
Gehlen would later similarly refer to reified second nature but by way of mankind‘s 
deficiency, using the term ―ersatz organs‖ when describing technologies and 
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institutions alike, with both of them compensating for the unfinished or lacking 
human; nonetheless, in both accounts in furnishing institutions qua norms culture 
becomes man‘s ―second nature.‖  
Accordingly, for Hegel every self-consciousness denaturalization engenders an 
unconscious re-naturalization, repressing Spirit. First there is subjection to necessity 
and then emancipation by way of generating another form of subjection. As Ludwig 
Feuerbach, a key disciple of Hegel, remarks: ―Man—this is the mystery of religion—
projects his being into objectivity, and then again makes himself an object to this 
projected image of himself thus converted into a subject; he thinks of himself as an 
object to himself, but as the object of an object, of another being than himself‖ 
(Feuerbach [1841] 2008: 181). 
Objectification thus yields the object to which the object-ifier is objecti-fied 
internally. This is the processual movement of alienation as double-objectification in 
Feuerbach and the young Marx.17 A naturalized scenography divulges itself where 
humans are necessarily self-externalizing, i.e., producers by nature. The termination 
of subjection is not the reinstatement of interiority—externalization is not the 
externalization of a pre-existing originary substance or the index of a vital source but, 
rather, a constant process of amendment, with this process generated because of the 
constituent non-identity of humans as self-transforming producers. Given this picture of Spirit, 
we are encouraged to see self-externalization as resulting in either a state that is 
alienated or un-alienated depending on the circumstances in question. Stiegler, 
however, collapses all norms and exercises of freedom into alienation by way of 
mechanical compulsion, such that we cannot measure the discrepancy between 
realized and unrealized collective human freedom, for our metaphysical collective 
Spirit is always being outpouched by way of a processual unfolding.18  
Recall how, in the Science of Logic ([1816] 2010), the universal and singular form 
totality, the concept passing into concrete existence which is, itself, free and is none 
other than the ‗I‘ or pure self-consciousness. The ‗I‘ is the pure concept itself, the 
concept that has come into determinate existence and finds itself instantiated into all 
manmade hardware.19 In Philosophy of Nature ([1830] 1970), Hegel constructs concepts 
that define Being by way of a tripartite model—the mechanical, the chemical, and the 
organic—demonstrating that these are instantiated into our productive experience of 
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the world in equal part, with the living body sustaining this ‗contradiction‘ (Hegel, 
1970: 10).20 For Kapp, Hegelian production as such is conceptually compounded into 
machine- or tool-construction and machine- or tool-use, with this ‗contradiction‘ 
elaborated upon by way of technical objects (which exteriorize, or ‗project‘ the 
organs of the body). Via Absolute Spirit, the eternal idea in and of itself keeps itself 
concentrated and reproduced, continually regenerating itself and enjoying its eternal 
status.21 By demonstrating an inner affinity between the constructed tool and the 
human organ, Kapp‘s notion of organprojektion (‗organ projection‘) facilitates a 
constructive affinity that is drive-based, as artefactual technesis results in the human 
being‘s made partial, or divided, such that the artefact serves as a means of 
reproduction. While contemporary Hegelians such as Robert Brandom take an 
interest in how language‘s reproduction is equipollent to mankind‘s sapience, Kapp 
designates technical objects as similarly primordial and biological—for Kapp, the 
human impulse to manufacture tools and machines is steeped in the well of cognitive 
activity from which language is drawn, with tool-construction similarly understood as 
reproductive activity fettered to reason and knowledge-production. With the organ-
cum-tool or -machine now partially separable from the entirety of Being, mankind‘s 
Being is defined and derived through the attributes, usage, and complexity of 
practicability.  
Kapp‘s cyclic and augmentive-physiognomic description of artefaction reveals his 
Hegelian plexus, with the ontological paradox of dialectical historicity as premised on 
an open Whole that is irremediably ruptured by its own absolute negativity. 
However, as the aforementioned description makes clear, his understanding of 
technical objects is normatively positive, with tools archiving consciousness. Another 
dialectical philosopher of organology, Raymond Ruyer, reserves consciousness as a 
kind of ‗absolute‘ form with non-localizable zones of indetermination. According to 
Ruyer, animal species produce phenotypically externalized technologies—‗spiders 
weave webs, beavers build dams, birds construct nests‘ (Smith, 2017: 121). In 
contrast to animals, humans engage in the quasi-finalist endeavor of fabricating 
technical artefacts. Here, Ruyer recollects Kapp‘s morphologically-directed and 
evolutionary understanding of artefaction—the ‗hammer externalizes the forearm 
and fist in wood and iron; clothing externalizes the skin; a baby‘s bottle externalizes 
the mother‘s breast; a kitchen stove externalizes the stomach; and so on‘ (Smith, 
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2017: 121). Directly citing Leroi-Gourhan‘s work while simultaneously calling to 
mind Kapp, Ruyer also notes that our ‗externalized organs‘ become detachable, 
removable and disparate from our body—therefore, our ‗bodily organs‘ are, 
themselves, uniquely technical artefacts. 
With Canguilhem, Kapp, and Ruyer, Being has its foundation in the question of 
eternal metahistorical identification, which begins with the Absolute Idealism of 
Hegel‘s teleological arrow but is further continued by the account of post-mechanist 
natural science, where Being is explicitly related to self-hood and presupposes ‗a 
whole of which subjects and objects are parts‘ (Hölderlin, 1988: 124-126). Given 
form by the reflective judgment, which imposes limit conditions upon cognition‘s 
freedom, Being materializes and internal emergence is extended through 
technologies. However, none of these aforementioned thinkers of organology were 
alive to speak of digitally embedded and networked technologies; Stiegler remains heir to 
organology, although he wields the throne as a pessimist of necessitarian alienation, 
collapsing technesis writ large.  
Alienated and unalienated states do have a place of distinction for Hegel, however. 
Hegel‘s insistence on phenomenological immanence amounts to the claim that we 
cannot arbitrarily create a criterion of unalienated Spirit based on what our current 
historical conception of what freedom is and, in turn, rules out any appeal or 
reference to an unalienated originary state. Thus, there is no such originary unalienated state, 
it is the stuff of mythology. This is the critical constraint of historical immanence, such 
that any differential criterion must be internal and immanent to the shape of self-
consciousness that is held under consideration. The problem is that the historical 
sequence is not empirically given, so we do not have access to it by way of our 
perceptual history. For Hegel, try as we will, we cannot get at alienation by threading 
historical facts together into a progressing narrative that unfolds from past to 
present. Deliberately and self-consciously constructing the retrospective 
preconditions for our current self-conception as free or unalienated is a matter of 
retrogressing to a previous unfreedom or alienation (in order to then discern our 
current measure of freedom or unalienation). As Brassier says, ―it entails that we are 
never in complete possession of the resources through which we confidently 
distinguish between alienating and non-alienating automatisms among contemporary 
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customs, institutions, or norms‖ (2020). The processual model of alienation reifies 
the moments in what is, for Hegel, an indivisible movement, where compulsion and 
freedom coincide. Estrangement cannot be the return of repression within spirit so 
long as this return is understood as the reiteration of a proceeding state and we are 
never in complete possession of the resources through which we could confidently 
distinguish between normatively positive and negative automatisms (as well as the 
technologies underpinning them). To acquire such resources we must retrospectively 
reconstruct the indivisible movement between what coincides, and this is but an 
impossible task. Estrangement and de-estrangement, compulsion and freedom, 
coincide for Hegel such that estrangement is not a repetition of compulsion within 
the attempt to undo compulsion so long as this repetition is understood as the 
reiteration of an initial or preceding state. Alienation proper, in both Marx and 
Hegel, is externalization as de-estrangement-cum-estrangement; the prospect of an 
unalienated state emerges by retrospection and, as a consequence, there can be no 
narrative about overcoming the need to overcome so long as self-externalization is 
compelled by the need to dominate external nature. Alienation will always generate a 
surplus of estrangement, a series of compulsive automatisms that prevent us from 
realizing our freedom.22 As such, we are necessarily directed towards constructing 
our machines—it is how we concede to Spirit, convincing Spirit of rationality‘s vim. 
In order to create an incision to solve the two unique problems that emerge here, the 
problem of phenomenological immanence (with Hegel) vs. the problem of 
naturalized metaphysical lossage (with Stiegler) we will eventually take a more 
systems-theory oriented approach that emphasizes how homeostasis and autopoiesis 
figure into the introduction of novelty, where any system‘s equilibrium is directed by 
way of technical objects and their entanglements. First, however, let us more 
exactingly scrutinize Stiegler. 
 
Stiegler’s Fatalism and Digital Media Artefacts 
Is Stiegler‘s program truly one of Prometheanism? If Prometheanism is the rejection 
of predetermined limits on action and self-transformation, then the parallel between 
rationalism and Prometheanism suggests that if action is constrained by thought and 
self-transformation is constrained by self-understanding, then the rejection on limits 
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on one entails the rejection of limiting the other (Brassier, 2014). That is, 
Prometheanism proposes that all reasons are ‗artificial‘ and rejects limits on 
artificialization, enjoining the wholesale reengineering of intelligence to our techno-
environmentally embedded ecology according to a more rational program of self-
invention than Stiegler‘s prescription of quasi-theological limits to artificialization. 
Kapp sparsely appears in Stiegler‘s pages as a direct source and Canguilhem even less 
so. Nonetheless, for Stiegler, as was the case for Kapp and Canguilhem, tools are 
imbricated in habitus. For Stiegler the relationship between tool and cognition is 
reflexive: ‗[t]he interior is constituted in exteriorization‘ (1998: 141), such that the 
tool (re)invents the human just as much as the human invents its tools. Stiegler‘s 
conception of Being recalls Hegel by way of its plasticity: Being here is progressive 
not only in the sense that information, as it is exteriorized beginning with early lithic 
technologies, accompanies hominid evolution but also in how media are related to 
neural development. Thus, Stiegler‘s engagement with externalization, like his 
predecessors, is preoccupied with registers of cognition. For Stiegler, like the flint 
tool, tools of writing are understood as epiphylogenetic vectors that advance 
corticalization; although stone tools were not crafted with the intention of storing 
memory, for Stiegler they inadvertently do so, inciting a series of learned motor 
actions (e.g., flexing the elbow in the act of using a hammer). Despite retrofitting 
Kapp and company‘s conception of media-as-externalization, however, Stiegler‘s 
sociological argument re: technics elicits an admixture of Derridean ontology with 
Husserlian phenomenology, where the externalization of technology imbricates mind 
and intention through successive feedback loops. Consider, for instance, how for 
Stiegler the true advent of externalized memory (‗mnemotechnics‘) finds its pinnacle 
with the invention of writing and demarcation; according to Stiegler, writing 
stabilizes language (vis-à-vis time-consciousness) in both the brain and the discursive 
world.23 Unlike writing, however, Stiegler regards those digital technologies that store 
memory, such as smart-phones and tablets, as software agents that deprive the user‘s 
freedom, making choices for the user in advance (Stiegler & Rouvroy, 2016). For 
Stiegler, with analog media after writing, but especially with digital media, we see not 
only the exteriorization of intention, mind, and memory but also its loss—instead of 
expanding the capacities of the human mind and brain, a loss occurs, outsourcing the 
mind without emancipating the human agent. If we are to take Stiegler at his word, 
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digital artefaction‘s relationship with technē ought to be understood as normatively 
negative, as it results in the deprivation of human agency (what Stiegler terms 
‗noesis‘) and alienation: 
This exteriorization that constitutes the principle of ‗liberation‘ is always 
also an ‗alienation‘: it leads to an offsetting of neganthropic possibilities 
to exosomatized organs that amounts to a kind of dependence, which is 
the basis of proletarianization as the loss of knowledge (of how to live, 
work, and conceptualize), that is, as entropy. This is nothing new 
(Stiegler, 2019: 50). 
In a recently translated book, The Age of Disruption (2019), Stiegler makes it his 
mission to: 
…show, by combining Foucault‘s analysis with that of Sloterdijk, that 
what the latter describes as a process of disinhibition is made possible by 
the tensions and contradictions that occur over the course of the 
successive doubly epokhal redoublings that unfold from the late Middle 
Ages to the Renaissance, the classical age, the first industrial revolution, 
the advent of Taylorism (which is also the advent of consumerism, the 
culture industry, and marketing), and, finally digital technology—agent of 
the contemporary disruption (ibid., 111). 
The Age of Disruption is only the most recent articulation of this project, but since it is 
the most recently translated into English,24 it includes the most novel references to 
digital technologies, including GPS vehicle tracking systems and smart watches. 
While references to actual technologies are sparse, it seems that Stiegler has no 
laudatory words for recent developments such as fitness wearables and location 
tracking apps that harvest data and metadata, or which engage in social media sharing 
and life-logging infrastructure. For Stiegler, these technologies are far from the 
positive self-archivization or self-curation of labor that those such as Gordon Bell 
and Jim Gemmell identify with becoming ‗the librarian archivist, cartographer, and 
curator of your life‘ (2009: 5); for Stiegler such embedded wearables further 
disembody one‘s autonomy by way of pushing us into an objectified mass, each of us 
becoming an unwitting member of the cognitariat.25 
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Mark B.N. Hansen‘s critique of Stiegler takes his normatively negative positioning of 
phenomenology as its object. For Hansen, Stiegler‘s phenomenological system is 
tunnel-visioned; Hansen‘s project takes issue with this picture of consciousness that 
undermines what also makes networks and microtemporal digital devices useful—
their possibility of shaping the future by way of honing in on the operational present 
(in a way that we, deprived of digital technologies, are restrained from accessing). 
Unlike Stiegler, Hansen sees digital media as also engaged in the channeling of 
agency, and thus understands the ‗causal efficacy‘ of digital media as normatively 
positive (2015: 197). For Hansen, twenty-first century media in particular can 
enhance our cognitive, perceptual, and sensory agency precisely because they put us 
into functional cooperation with other cognitive, perceptual, and sensory agents that 
not only follow protocols of their own, but that, most crucially, operate 
environmentally—‗independently of and autonomously from our directly 
experienced, conscious agency‘ (ibid., 183).  
Hansen‘s critique primarily cites Deleuze‘s machine ontology and Whitehead‘s 
process philosophical system to account for that which Stiegler‘s occludes. From 
Deleuze, Hansen recuperates how ‗media might impact experience without being 
channeled through delimited, higher-order processes‘, thus understanding media as 
ends in themselves (36). From Whitehead, Hansen reconceives of how perceptions 
can be understood from within the material universe where causality reigns, moving 
beyond a strictly perception-centered account to one where perceptions are, 
themselves, caused by the very same kind of shift that causes all events in the 
universe‘s becoming (48). Moving through causal processes in cyclic fashion, 
Hansen, too, is a thinker of dialectical organology, using Deleuze and Whitehead‘s 
process philosophy to understand the non-perceptual world through the aperture of 
perception.26  
Another feature of Hansen‘s project is his conception of ‗feed-forward‘ systems, 
which presents propensity as causally directed by future efficacy, such that 
continuous data-gathering, microcomputational processing and predictive analytics 
make a new episteme possible. According to Hansen, our contemporary conception 
of technē must be understood as an ‗enveloping of virtualities offered to the body, 
which constitutes the fundamental anchor point for present and future technological 
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evolutions, and which induces an automatized and fluid relation to the milieu‘ 
(Hansen in Grusin, 2010: 117-118). Consequently, Hansen‘s resolutely speculative 
ontologising of predictive processing is predicated on an ecological functor of 
equipossibility and the independence of outcomes.  
According to Hansen, Stiegler‘s conception of technicity does not properly apply to 
today‘s enactive field of predictive calculation. That is, Stiegler‘s model of time-
consciousness and anticipation (what Stiegler calls ‗protension‘) operates in relation 
to a static source of inert possibilities. Hansen remarks that predictive probabilities, 
on the other hand, do not project past data into the future but generatively integrate 
present data:  
[w]hatever else it betokens, twenty-first-century media centrally involve a 
massive expansion in, as well as a fundamental differentiation—a 
‗heterogenesis‘—of, the interface between human being and sensory 
environment. Consciousness‘s Being […] becomes, in and through the 
operationality of twenty-first-century media, a functional […] processual, 
relationship. With this functionalisation, moreover, the relationship 
between aboutness and being, between data as access to sensibility and 
data as sensibility, undergoes a certain reconceptualisation through its 
anchoring in temporalisation: aboutness is linked to being in an incessant 
oscillation, where each act of access onto sensibility creates a new unit of 
sensibility that itself calls forth a new act of access that creates a new unit 
of sensibility‘ (Hansen, 2015: 17). 
Hansen is, effectively, interested in the ‗becoming‘ of homeostatic systems that self-
regulate, a becoming that Stiegler reduces to an ellipsis of lossage, a telos of 
asymptotic reduction whereby creativity, potential, and freedom find themselves 
overturned to disruption and anomie (Stiegler: 2019). In addition to Hansen‘s 
critique, however, and perhaps more detrimentally—particularly when we consider 
how Stiegler conflates the conditions for genesis of language with the conditions of 
its reproduction when he writes about linguistic systems—we can remark that 
Stiegler negotiates metaphysics from within. There is no distinction in terms of complexity 
between the analog and the digital,27 just an arbitrary line between that which is 
fundamentally tethered to organic existence and preternatural existence, which is 
 ERKAN | Promethean Philosophy 
 
 
 
103 
 
negatively determined. That is, Stiegler produces a quasi-materialist ontology that 
positively addresses the Hegelian Objective Spirit as the inscription of object-ified 
knowledge, according to which ‗objectified knowledge is the consequence of the 
epiphylogenetic formation that arose in life with the practical activity of human 
beings‘ (Stiegler, 2020: 179). Yet Stiegler‘s explanatory ontologization of 
grammatization is akin to a half-formed functionalism that engages solely on the level 
of empirical content—it characterizes a system as functional in nature by treating its 
function in terms of stimulus-response dispositions. In short, Stiegler does not 
differentiate conceptual activity from non-conceptual activity. For the early Hegelian 
theorists of externalization/projection, the Dasein of Geist supervened upon 
ontogenesis but, for Stiegler, there is no differential identity of acquisition.  
 
Simondon and Constructivist Cybernetics: On Second-
Order Systems 
How, then, can we extract a philosophy of differential media without reducing the 
objects of mediation to (externalized) appearances? Hansen is, indeed, correct to 
point out that what Stiegler elides is a process-philosophical understanding of 
causality. Instead of Deleuze or Whitehead, however, I propose a return to 
Simondon—specifically, that which Stiegler misses in Simondon. Stiegler is, as I seek 
to demonstrate, a crude reader of Simondon and in some sense a traitor to 
Simondon. First of all, Simondon is utterly opposed to Heidegger,28 as Simondon 
actively dismisses the study of technical objects in terms of the relations that can be 
established with them.29 Simondon‘s project is marked by a sociological stripe: to 
reclaim technical operations from the teeth of (Capitalist) work and prod forth 
specialization and a place for a philosophy of technics, which is markedly scientific. 
This means separating technical activity and knowledge from the doctrine of work, 
Capital, and the criterion of productivity by encouraging a relationship between man 
and technical objects where one is not only the owner of their machines and means 
of productions but imbricated in their maintenance, adjustment, engineering, 
knowledge, and further invention. 
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Simondon offers a unique stripe of process philosophy of the ‗transindividual‘, which 
Stiegler refers to in name only but does not make conceptually central to his system. 
Deleuze‘s machine ontology, at least as it treats ‗actualization‘ (the co-determination 
between beings and technical artefacts), is tethered to Simondon so rather than 
jumping to Deleuze in order to analyze today‘s digital protocols, my study—which 
agrees with Hansen that process philosophy has immense instrumental value to 
understand ‗feedforward systems‘—turns to Simondon. First of all, what 
distinguishes Simondon from the previous dialectical thinkers of organology is that 
Simondon is a thinker of genesis above all else. This is why he will serve as a valuable 
resource when we consider the roots of deep learning‘s algorithmic infrastructure 
given case studies such as AlphaGo Zero, which has been admired by philosophers 
and technicians alike due to how it generates inventive winning moves that even 
master players such as Lee Sedol and Ke Jie could not predict (e.g., the infamous 
‗move 37‘). 
Furthermore, Simondon‘s philosophical program is non-dialectical. This also sets 
him aside from the aforementioned Hegelian genealogy. For Simondon, genesis‘ role 
is to deal with something that dialectics elides, as Simondon‘s conception of 
individuation does not correspond to the appearance of the negative. Rather, 
Simondon considers the role of genesis as something immanent to conceptual 
negativity; Simondon, as a thinker of the existence of potentials, is primarily 
preoccupied with the cause of incompatibility and the non-stability of pre-individual 
genesis—that which precedes the genesis of an object. Given his penchant for 
complex systems, we will also make the case for Simondon as a thinker of second-
order cybernetics (the conceptual predecessor to deep learning‘s logic of predictive 
inference). Alongside genesis, Simondon is concerned with transductive relations: how 
subjects and objects engage in mutual structuration such that identity is metastable 
(much like second order cybernetics and W. Ross Ashby‘s conception of allostatic 
behavior). Unlike Hegel, for Simondon the negative appears initially as an ontogenetic 
incompatibility, but, after examination, reveals itself to, in actuality, merely illuminate a 
wellspring of potentials. Thus, Simondon‘s notion of the ‗negative‘ is not a 
substantial or regulative negative—it is not a stage or phase. Unlike Hegel, Kapp, 
Leroi-Gourhan, or Stiegler, the process of individuation for Simondon is not a 
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synthesis or return to unity but a phase-shift of Being based on a pre-individual center 
of potentialized incompatibility. 
Simondon‘s description of communication as such is critical to consider in 
formulating a rigorous philosophy of becoming that applies to machines and their 
systems of equilibrium, which I argue is a highly pertinent concept when thinking of 
predictive patterning in deep learning, a development born out of second order 
cybernetics‘ critique of first-order cybernetics. Simondon‘s On the Mode of Existence of 
Technical Objects (2017) is composed of three sections. Part I, entitled Genesis and 
Evolution of Technical Objects, is devoted to the study of the machine itself and 
closely considers the terms of what computer scientist John Hart30 terms ‗intrinsic 
machine reality‘—that is, Simondon parses the principles of the nature of the 
technical object while supplementing this study with corresponding examples. Part 
II, Man and the Technical Object, launches a critique of mechanology and first-order 
cybernetics, particularly Norbert Wiener‘s mechanist paradigm. Simondon‘s 
conception of technical objects opposes the conception of automata according to a 
human resemblance-model or the conflation of natural and technical objects, 
preferring, instead, an analysis by way of functional organization. In the final section, 
Part III, Genesis of Technicality, Simondon most lucidly articulates his normative 
program concerning the convergence between technics, the machine, and 
philosophy. 
Why is Simondon a thinker of environmental synergies? In order to make the 
normative value of ‗technics‘ clear—for Simondon, ‗technics‘, as a philosophical 
term,  invokes normativity in a way that ‗technology‘ does not—Simondon recalls a 
curious incident. Simondon notes that ‗about ten years ago‘ a group of science 
university students attempted a small profanation that illuminates the normative 
value of technics outside of the practical consequences they generally appear to 
entail. The science students disrupted the clock atop the Paris Observatory, causing 
an uproar (2017: 229). Simondon highlights this as an example of the inherence of 
technicity‘s values surpassing utility, critiquing the Heideggerian conception of 
technics as separate utensils understood solely through their relational status as ontic 
objects (i.e., by way of their use-value), shining a light on the necessarily networked 
nature of technics—such is the reticulated structuration, which can change in 
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intensity but never disappears (even though its ‗readiness-to-hand‘ is modulated by 
way of its breaking).31 The reticulated nature of technics is thus well illustrated by the 
image of the Paris Observatory clock domineering over the perturbed Parisians.32  
According to Simondon, ‗technics‘ considers the coordinated and mutually organized 
relation at the level of machines, man, and culture. For Simondon, ‗the true nature of 
man is not to be a tool bearer—and thus a competitor of the machine, but man‘s 
nature is that of the inventor of technical and living objects capable of resolving 
problems of compatibility between machines within an ensemble‘ (2017: xvi). In 
rendering machines compatible with a particular function, man opens up the 
mutually contingent flow of information, a signal of transindividual exchange.33 Man‘s 
assiduous invention and reinvention also invites technicity to unmask the pretensions 
of rationality, with Simondon‘s concept of invention shepherding the long-term 
progressive undertaking of a program of self-betterment and self-improvement 
rather than the blind effect of contingent causes. 
 In Genesis and Evolution of Technical Objects, Simondon pursues a review of 
various technical objects and how the technical object, in itself, is characterized by 
sundry functional processes and modalities of genesis. Simondon separates the 
genesis of the technical object, by which it becomes a proper object of study, into a 
tripartite and non-dialectical cast: the element, the individual, and the ensemble (20). Much 
of Simondon‘s research is devoted to the erudition of particular machines, their 
evolutional lineage(s), and their functional assemblies—Simondon undergoes this 
pursuit with impressive rigor. From Coolidge and Crookes tubes to thermo-dynamic 
machines, anode-cathode synergies, semi-conductors, and vacuum valves, Simondon 
carves a pure schema of functioning, examining technical objects and their conductance 
by way of and through the phenomena from which their fecundity foments. Of 
particular interest to Simondon is concretization, the process by which any technical 
object is posited within an intermediate place between the natural object and its 
scientific representation. This process is separate from invention, the latter dealing 
with our genealogical heritage and natural kinds. Rather than the shift from idea to 
physical artefact, concretization deals with internal self-coherence (cycles of 
refinement), the ‗way technical objects shift their internal composition as they iterate 
from one version or instance of a schema to the next‘ (Rieder, 2020: 61-62). 
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According to Simondon‘s system, the primitive technical object is distinguished from the 
constitution of a natural system—the primitive technical object is not a 
natural/physical system but the ‗physical translation of an intellectual system‘ and, 
thus, a bundle of applications (Simondon, 2017: 49). Opposed to the primitive technical 
object is the concrete technical object, which produces a mapping of causes and effects by 
way of internal coherence (homeostasis), a closure of functional resolve that 
designates the technical object‘s evolution and processes of human intervention. 
Simondon provides the example of an artificial plant/flower grown in a greenhouse, 
which yields petals—‗a double flower‘—and is unable to bear fruit due to processes 
of human grafting (49). By way of artificialization, the interventive rendering of a 
natural object into a complex system of thermal and hydraulic (i.e., autopoietic) 
regulations via machinic coherence, we see how biological capacities and their 
functions are outpouched to a mechanic framing system and, simultaneously, are 
specialized in cyclic fashion.  
 In Man and the Technical Object, Simondon‘s criticism of Wiener‘s project brings 
forth considerations similar to that of cybernetic constructivism, endo-modelling, 
and action-oriented neuroeconomic patterning—the tenets of second order 
cybernetics which we will further elaborate on soon. Written in the 1950s, this 
section finds Simondon critiquing Wiener‘s 1950 publication, The Human Use of 
Human Beings. Conceptualizing information as an entity distinct from the substrate(s) 
carrying it and likening self-regulating technical objects to living beings, Wiener here 
proclaims that: 
‗[i]f the feedback system is itself controlled—if, in other words, its own 
entropic tendencies are checked by still other controlling mechanisms—
and kept within limits sufficiently stringent, this [disastrous instability] 
will not occur, and the existence of the feedback will increase the stability 
of performance of the gun. In other words, the performance will become 
less dependent on the frictional load; or what is the same thing, on the 
drag created by the stiffness of the grease. Something very similar to this 
occurs in human action‘ (1954: 25). 
According to Wiener, man (and the animal) have a kinaesthetic sense that, like the 
machine, is subject to varied external environmental effects related to informational 
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exchange by way of negative feedback. In turn, contingency acquires meaning by way 
of reference to recursion. This is precisely why Wiener compliments any mention of 
homeostatic processes with internal regulation, finding a parallel in the nervous 
system and computing machines wherefore computing machines and human/animal 
nervous systems are conceived of by way of reference to physiological processes of 
detection, an ‗all-or-none‘ principle of measuring transmitted intensity (Wiener, 1965: 
120). Following the prototypic probabilistic laws of internal regulation and 
Leibnizian universalism, Wiener‘s cybernetics conceives of information by way of 
measurement as a degree of organization. For Simondon, however, technical objects 
must be studied in their evolution in order for one to discern the process of 
concretization. Simondon is not satisfied with Wiener‘s conception of individuation 
by way of circumscribing probabilistic events. While Simondon‘s conception of 
individuation is equipollent to an understanding of information concerned with that 
which precedes differentiation and facilitates an operation in a system, Simondon 
also harbors an ulterior concern: the intra-individual psychical problematic of 
perception and affectivity, which leads to the collective level of the transindividual. 
Since Simondon‘s target is first-order cybernetics, with reference to Wiener in 
particular, it makes a great deal of sense that criticisms similar to those launched by 
Simondon in the late 1950s would be prodded forth by those second-order 
cyberneticists (of the 1960s and 70s) who endorsed the endo-model. The endo-model 
provides for an understanding of models within systems, as opposed to exo-models, or 
models of systems (i.e., models that we, as observers, construct of systems). The endo-
model is a stable and simulated internal control system used to model anticipatory 
control dynamics between mode, system, and environment. This endo-model also 
introduces environmentally coupled relations of entailment, force, and influence, 
wherefore the phenomena of circular causality, self-reference, and self-production 
dovetail via autopoiesis. Unlike Wiener‘s interest in regulation by way of negative 
feedback, autopoietic systems—as delineated by Francisco Varela, Humberto 
Maturana, and Ricardo B. Uribe‘s work in biology and supplemented by Milan 
Zeleny‘s work on the economy of self-sustainable systems—deal with the structural 
knowledge that makes a system capable of producing/reproducing its unique self-
organization. Unlike Wiener‘s cybernetics, second-order cybernetics‘ autopoiesis 
necessitates a physical boundary that separates the system from its surroundings; in 
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Simondon, we see a similar treatment of technical objects and their associated 
milieu(s), i.e., a similar segregation of subjects from objects. As a theory of self-
reference, autopoiesis takes those processes generated through a closed organization 
of production and designates that this same organization is regenerated through the 
interactions within a system‘s own products (or components).  
Ernst von Glasersfeld, Heinz von Foerster, and Maturana‘s elaboration of machines 
as autopoietic or self-creating systems articulates Simondon‘s concern in 
distinguishing how transindividual systems can be considered as distinct from a 
transmission model where knowledge is directly thought of and conceived as being a 
representation of an external objective or mind-independent reality (as in the case of 
Wiener). According to Glasersfeld and Foerster‘s functional constructivism there is a 
systematic interface from which all of our knowledge about the world springs forth. 
We do not have access to the description of any environment but, instead, features—
particular patterns with which we construct possible orderings of functional 
relationships (systems of categories, feature spaces, objects, states/state transitions, 
etc.). That is, we do not empirically recognize the given objects of our environment 
but are involved in constructing them by way of the informational regularities that 
becomes systemized, presented as they are at the interface of our cognitive system 
(Foerster & Glasersfeld, 1999). Glasersfeld‘s emphasis on observationally-
constructed consensual domains finds its compliment in Maturana‘s notion of 
structural coupling(s) between system and environment, where consensual domains of 
interaction and communication are ecologically ordered between objects, events, and 
classes (Maturana & Varela, 1980). Moving from a reflective judgment and the 
moment of the ‗I‘ to the ‗not-I‘, communication is no longer about registration of 
information or its transmission, but instead a circular coupling between the ‗I‘ and its 
environment in which each reentering (homeostasis) is indicated by the integration of 
reflection. For Simondon, this means a structural coupling between subject and 
totality and technical objects facilitate such transindividuation.  
According to the research program of second-order cybernetics, there is reflexive 
acknowledgement between structure and behavior regardless of whatever a priori 
predications observers adopt. For such second-order cyberneticians it is critical to 
recognize that although there are such a prioris, observers become reflectively aware 
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of them vis-à-vis the epistemological, evolutionary, and ontogenetic development of 
systems (which observe and ‗converse‘ with one another). This turn is often captured 
by the umbrella term ‗radical constructivism‘, which endorses Jean Piaget‘s 
conception of knowledge as an adaptive function, echoing Simondon‘s appraisal of 
Wiener‘s cybernetic program for being mistakenly founded upon the ‗intention of 
command and communication in the living being and the machine‘ while eliding 
detailed considerations as to ‗how one can put individuals representing homeostatic 
functions at the heads of [organizational] groups‘ (Simondon, 2017: 160). 
Glasersfeld, Foerster, Valera, and Maturana take up similar concerns regarding the 
conception of knowledge and its adaptive function, wherein ‗cognitive efforts have the 
purpose of helping us cope in the world of experience, rather than the traditional 
goal of furnishing an ‗objective‘ representation of a world as it might ‗exist‘ apart 
from us and our experience‘ (von Glasersfeld, 1991).  
Despite the founding fathers of cybernetics such as Wiener, McCulloch, Bateson, 
and co. emphasized autonomy and self-organization vis-a-vis the self-organization 
and subjectivity of modelling, they were not all first-order reductionists. Ashby‘s 
constructivist turn is particularly important for the move away from first-order 
cybernetics—where a system is understood as passive and objectively given, such 
that it can be manipulated—into second-order-cybernetics, where the system is seen 
as cast in engagement with the observer. According to Ashby‘s ‗constructivism‘, the 
observer, too, is a cybernetic dictum. In Ashby‘s framework, there are two critical 
principles that have become most important for homeostatic self-regulating systems:  
1) Homeostasis of Internal Essential Variables (Principle of Ultrastability); according 
to this principle variables move beyond specific viability limits and, as a 
consequence, are part of adaptive processes that are triggered by and re-
parameterize a system until it reaches a new equilibrium, at which point 
homeostasis is restored. In physiology, one can think of such essential 
variables as corresponding to blood pressure, heart rate, blood sugar 
levels. Such systems embody two levels of feedback at least: i) a first-order 
feedback that homeostatically regulates essential variables, like a 
thermostat, and a second-order feedback that allostatically reorganizes a 
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system‘s input–output relations when first-order feedback fails (Ashby, 
1952). 
2) Law of Requisite Variety; a successful control system must be capable of 
entering at least as many states as the system being controlled (i.e., ‗only 
variety in R can force down the variety due to D‘ [Ashby, 1956: 206-
207]). 
Ashby‘s constructivist description provides a bridge between first- and second-order 
cybernetics, providing a paradigm highly useful for those contemporary models of 
neuro-inferential ‗perceptual control theory‘ and ‗inference to the best prediction‘ in 
Bayesian modeling.34 Ashby‘s principles imply a minimum level of complexity for a 
successful controller (or, to recall Simondon, an agent of ‗individuation‘), which is 
determined by the causal complexity of the environmental states that constitute 
potential perturbations to a system‘s essential variables. 
For Simondon, such ‗error-correction‘ is inherent to how we deal with technical 
objects as inherently machinic, for they necessarily wield with equal force a rapport to 
man and systems-relational characteristics (i.e., analogical structure and analogical human 
dynamism). These two internal characteristics of the technical object simply cannot be 
understood if the technical object is conflated with the tool, ‗which then makes it 
lose its individuality and therefore its own value; as Piaget has remarkably shown 
based on archaeological and ethnographic considerations, the tool is deprived of its 
own individuality because it is grafted onto another individualized organism‘s body 
part and because its function is to extend, reinforce, and protect but not replace the 
latter‘ (Simondon, 2020b, 417).35 For Simondon, machines are not externalizations 
(of mind, memory, or intentionality) but endowed with differential relational 
situatedness in their own right. Simondon‘s critique of Wiener is at the level of 
cognition—including perception and action—and invention, with an interest in how 
systems maintain the homeostasis of essential variables and of internal organization. 
More generally, Simondon‘s critique of cybernetics is rooted in his refusal to consider 
the machine as an isolated system. His concern is not with autonomous machines 
but with machines that are steeped in an exchange between machine and 
environment. Thus, Simondon marks a difference between machines that operate 
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with and by their own process and those machines that are able to modify their own 
process according to environmental variation. Such machines are distinguished from 
those like the thermo-siphon, which operates simply by means of registering or 
reacting to information (2017: 266). Simondon‘s interest is in systems that engage in 
a proper convergence of economic constraints and technical requirements, where the 
machine maintains its stable functioning (for as long as possible) while exchanging 
with its environment (i.e., reciprocal modification [2017: 21]). This is directly in 
contrast to how Wiener articulates man without reference to interiority by way of 
environmental homeostasis; Wiener conceives of the social system as ‗an 
organization like the individual, that it is bound together by a system of 
communication‘ (1961: 24), where man and machine solely exchange information with 
their environment without being mutually constituted by way of adequation and 
relative positions of observational instability. Elsewhere, Simondon critiques not only 
Wiener but ‗Shannon, Fischer [sic], Hartley‘ (2020b: 686)36 and the given relationship 
of information as solely a relationship between an emitter and receiver. This centers 
our debate over whether information should be considered an explanatory tool—an 
epistemic heuristic that does not refer back to a basic constituent of nature—or 
fundamentally ontological. Thus, this position ultimately concerns whether 
information can be said to be ultimately fundamental when understanding the 
‗objective modal structure of the world‘, which reiterates our earlier concerns about 
the relation between structure and matter. 
For Simondon, in order for culture to incorporate technical objects one has to 
discover an adequate intermediary between the majority and minority status of 
technical objects. With the former, social relations are brought into relation while, in 
the case of the latter, the object is conceived as a matter of utility. As a consequence, 
the ‗secret and stable aspect of such a technics is thus not only a product of social 
conditions; it produces the structure of groups as much as this structure of the group 
conditions it. It is possible that every technics must to a certain extent contain a 
coefficient of intuition and instinct necessary for establishing the appropriate 
communication between man and the technical being‘ (Simondon, 2017: 109). Such a 
divergence between man and technical being corresponds to the discrepancy 
between any (perceptible) model of empirical predicates and its categorization, 
making the claim that such a chasm is not arbitrary. Rather, this fracture answers to 
 ERKAN | Promethean Philosophy 
 
 
 
113 
 
the meta-theoretic explanatory aims between objects‘ components/differential parts 
and the mind-dependence of sensory episodes: Simondon‘s conception of 
communication accounts for the inferential-causal dependency between the presence 
of physical objects with given qualities and a corresponding sensory experience, and 
the qualitative homogeneity attributed to such experiences. However, such a 
framework cannot explain the distinction between ostensible and veridical 
perception, and thus the possibility of error when making perceptual reports 
concerning the sensory determinations supervenes upon communication, which is 
always privy to error-corrections—Simondon‘s understanding of homeostasis, a 
becoming-equilibrium. Unlike tools taken in isolation, with machines and organisms, 
Being is thus conceived of as the structure of all structures, the absolutely primordial 
and comprehensive structure (Puntel, 2010: 439).37 
For Simondon, the individual (or Being) is the reality of any constituting relation 
rather than occupying the interiority of a constituted term; thus ‗the intrinsic, the 
interiority of the individual, would not exist without the ongoing relational operation 
that the ongoing individuation is‘ (2020a: 50). Unlike the aforementioned dialectical 
treatment of being, when it comes to the level of the individual Simondon 
understands Being as the value of a relation—at the level of individuation, the 
individual can be considered ‗a being with an interiority relative to which an 
exteriority exists‘ (50). Thus, it is not the externalized media (the liberation of organs, 
mind, or memory) that defines Being, but the system that this media, digital or 
analog, communicates across.  
Consider the model of crystallization which, for Simondon, allows him to establish a 
transcendental field for individuation without positing a substantialist division 
between different modes of existence, such as ‗physical beings‘ (e.g., crystal) and 
living beings (e.g., plants). For Simondon, there is an ontological difference between 
physical and living beings: the former is characterized by carrying its associated 
milieu with it. For instance, the ―crystal stops growing when you remove it from its 
aqueous solution‖ while the ―plant may stop growing if you do not water it, but it 
carries a good deal of water with it, which allows for greater regulation of the relation 
between its inner and external milieus. It even puts water into circulation with its 
ecology‘ (Lamarre, 2019: 109). For Simondon, the transcendental movement of 
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evolution is not teleological or dialectical but deals with structure and reorganized 
material flows along transindividual relations, recombining aspects. Although some, 
such as Steven Shaviro, may draw the distinction that in Varela‘s ‗autopoiesis, the 
emphasis is on a continuity that is created and preserved in and through continual 
change and interaction with the environment, whereas in individuation and 
[Whitehead‘s] concrescence, the emphasis is on the production of novelty, the 
entity‘s continual redefinition, or becoming‘ (Shaviro, 2009: 112), for Simondon the 
relational system maintains itself through dynamic interaction with its environment, 
re-creating the very processes that produce it. An entity not only reconstitutes itself 
by actualizing potentials that preexist in a metastable environment but negotiates this 
reconstitution with recursive homeostasis. This recursive logic is inseparable from 
the unspooling of novel systems, moored by homeostatic thresholds. 
It is critical for Simondon that the technical object does not facilitate its own 
operation(s) but that there is an integration between the machine and the technical. 
Simondon often makes mention of ‗the virtual‘, remarking that ‗[t]he living thing has 
the faculty to modify itself according to the virtual: this faculty is the sense of time, 
which the machine does not have because it does not live‘ (2017: 157). It is 
important to note that Simondon‘s conception of the virtual is distinct from 
Deleuze‘s. Simondon is not interested in the possibility of modification of process. 
He is, instead, describing a real process and this real process is happening in actuality, i.e., the 
process of individuation.38 Consequently, Simondon is interested in the media object 
as a threshold of intensity and quality—here, Simondon is working against the 
hylomorphism of pure matter and pure form/the alliance of form and matter, which 
he deems a contradiction. For Simondon, the physical object is a bundle of 
differential relations, an organization of thresholds and of levels which are 
maintained and transposed via a myriad of variegated situations, with the object‘s 
properties cohering and undergoing variations as it moves from one state to another 
(2020a: 264-265).  
To better understand this, we ought to situate Simondon within the history of 
philosophy. Simondon‘s philosophy begins with the Aristotelian classic model 
whereby we have matter, devoid of shape, quality, or determined characteristics, and 
we have forms, which are a priori and characterize matter by giving them form (while 
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being unique in kind as distinct causes). Simondon is actively working against this 
Aristotelian model of hylomorphism: for Simondon, there are no a priori forms that 
are imposed onto undetermined matter—matter is determined itself through the 
process of individuation. Simondon begins from matter rather than a priori forms, as 
forms emerge through a difference of matter by which matter is crossed, like a 
(quantum/differential) field, by a difference of potential. This is also analogous with 
our empirical observations—Simondon thus remarks that, if ‗to perceive consists in 
increasing the information of the system formed by the subject and the field in which 
it is oriented, the conditions of perception are analogous to those of every stable 
structuration: a metastable state must precede perception‘ (2020a: 269). This 
‗objective field‘, which Simondon often makes reference to and describes as a 
primitive, neutral, and ‗magical‘ stage, is the arena upon which man and mediation 
find themselves fundamentally structured through circuits of exchange qua being—
that is, ‗[m]an finds himself linked to a universe experienced as a milieu‘ (2017: 
177).39  
For Simondon, the objectivation of mediation has a correlative in the subjectivation 
of mediation, which is object-ified and objectivized by way of the technical object 
that tethers man and the world to one another. The field of reference here, the 
‗magical stage‘, precedes mediation and, thus, precedes subjectivization or 
objectivization, neither fragmented nor universalized; it ‗is only the simplest and 
most fundamental of structurations of the milieu of a living being: the birth of a 
network of privileged points of exchange between the being and the milieu‘ (2017: 
177). This conception of a differential stage that precedes mediation and mediation‘s 
becoming-subjectivized or -objectivized is similar to an electric field of electrostatic 
vectors and it is no coincidence that Simondon often recalls such electrical fields 
often in his writing.  
For Simondon, these two ideas—matter and field/neutral foundation—are related to 
one another, as demonstrated in his references to the (preindividual) ‗found‘ [fond] as 
the background upon which a form/figure may emerge: 
…there would not only be a genesis of technicity, but also a genesis on 
the basis of technicity, through the splitting of an original technicity into 
figure and ground [fond], the ground corresponding to the functions of 
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totality that are independent of each application of technical gestures, 
whereas the figure, made of definite and particular schemas, specifies 
each technique as a manner of acting. The deepest reality [réalité de fond] 
of technics constitutes theoretical knowledge, whereas the particular 
schemas give us praxis‘ (2017: 171). 
For Simondon, matter is like a field with differences in potential; forms emerge in 
matter and they are not given a priori. Form is not a priori imposed onto 
undifferentiated matter but, instead, forms emerge through a process of 
individuation.40 For Simondon, given the technical operation that gives rise to an 
object with form and matter, the dynamism of this operation simply cannot be 
represented by the matter-form pair. Unlike the Hegelian dialectic based on the notion of 
identity and non-identity—the opposition between ‗A‘ and ‗not-A‘, or ‗I‘ and ‗not-
I‘—Simondon‘s work on relations seeks to explain the genesis of phenomenal reality 
(including the objects populating it) and the subject by way of a dialectic founded on 
the idea of the differential, rather than contradiction.41 Difference, as indeterminate 
and preindividual variation, is not the limit between two given identities but a non-
phenomenal condition of all identity engendered as a determined object of and for 
thought. Simondon‘s differential relations place media in relation with their spatio-
temporal relations of realization; this kind of infinitesimal difference accounts for 
genesis outside of the self, understanding the real/actual non-phenomenal conditions 
of the process of individuation of thought. As with Deleuzean difference, 
Simondon‘s difference can be linked to the model of calculus, which maps the 
processes by which thought determines itself on the basis of that which is non-
phenomenal, on the basis of the differential (the dx). As a process of actualization or 
becoming-differenciated,42 individualization is always and necessarily a genuine creation. 
Progressing by way of spatio–temporal dynamism, a differentiated idea is 
differenciated—it is a process of individuation in the sense of dramatizing the idea, 
producing an ‗indistinct differential relation in the Idea to incarnate itself in a distinct 
quality and a distinguished intensity‘, with the result being that ‗the individual finds 
itself attached to a pre-individual half which is not the impersonal within it so much 
as the reservoir of its singularities‘ (Deleuze, 1996: 245, 246).  Railing against 
hylomorphism, Simondon remarks that ‗[t]he form and the matter of the 
hylomorphic schema are an abstract form and an abstract matter‘ (2020a: 22), where:  
 ERKAN | Promethean Philosophy 
 
 
 
117 
 
[t]he hylomorphic schema is thus a couple in which the two terms are 
clear and the relation obscure […. And] represents the transposition into 
philosophical thought of the technical operation reduced to work, and 
taken as a universal paradigm of the genesis of beings. It is indeed a 
technical experience, but a very incomplete technical experience that is at 
the basis of this paradigm. The generalized use of the hylomorphic 
schema in philosophy introduces an obscurity that comes from the 
insufficiency of this schemas technical basis‘ (2017: 248). 
For Simondon, as in the example of a brick, definite Being does not result from the 
combination of unspecified matter with unspecified form (where form is imposed 
upon the brick). Simondon criticizes this Aristotelian hylomorphic model that 
presupposes a priori forms—for Simondon, there are only forms insofar as they are 
co-determined by a process. Thus we do not need to turn to Whitehead or Deleuze 
for processual construction of subjectivism that emerges bottom-up.43   
Simondon‘s considerations of practical reason recall C.S. Peirce, where we have 
knowledge which depends on actions/decisions that are taken. Similarly, knowledge 
for Simondon is a know-how—to learn how to cope with environment, to make 
accurate predictions related to this environment, and so on. Knowledge as such 
provides us with a means of selecting important information in order to react in 
appropriate ways and to achieve a specific goal. For Simondon, the process of 
individuation is not so different from this idea, such that decisions taken or the 
knowledge of an environment that one has is not absolutely true but, instead, true 
relative to an appropriate solution to a specific problem. Accordingly, Simondon 
provides us with an intersubjective conception of environment; the creation of 
knowledge necessitates the most efficient way of actuating a goal.44 
We also ought to note that all communication for Simondon is prelinguistic. 
Communication as such is exacted by way of individuation; during this process of 
individuation, there is a sort of negotiation by way of action. As it involves the 
actant, action always forms a rapport with a discrete part/element such that the other 
part/element has to act in response in order to preserve its own equilibrium. Little by 
little, both elements ‗learn‘ how to interact; signification is the selection of or the 
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capacity of recognizing specific actions or affects coming from the environment or 
milieu. Thus, Simondon remarks that: 
[t]he emergence of the distinction between figure and ground is indeed 
the result of a state of tension, of the incompatibility of the system with 
itself from what one could call the oversaturation of the system; but 
structuration is not the discovery of the lowest level of equilibrium: 
stable equilibrium, in which all potential would be actualized, would 
correspond to the death of any possibility of further transformation; 
whereas living systems, those which precisely manifest (2017: 177). 
Simondon‘s description of communication provides us with a rich philosophy of 
becoming. Consider how this structuration would apply to, say, bacterium; bacterium 
are not ‗intelligent‘ (i.e., sapient) and do not have a language but, nonetheless, are 
able to move within and through their environment in order to find food by 
discerning pertinent signs (e.g., difference in sugar in water). Thus, the bacterium 
selects different intensity from a signal or environ that is significant for it, matching 
exteroceptive and interoceptive inputs; the bacterium does not visually ‗see‘ anything 
but, by way of differential patterning, becomes sensible to difference(s) in degrees in 
relation to the substance it is interested in, which allows for it to move effectively 
and knowledgably—to move with reason. This top-down analytical approach allots a kind 
of prediction-error. This is what Simondon means when he designates signification 
before language (i.e., it is ‗prelinguistic‘), where intensity is precisely that which allows 
for reaction. In their being non-representational, deep learning neural networks are, similarly, 
prelinguistic. Consider how deep learning systems like AlphaGo Zero use previous data 
as a signal-processing heuristic to predict future variances.45 Simondon‘s notion of 
transindividuation, as applied to the bacterium, is not terribly different from how 
deep learning algorithms like AlphaGo Zero pluck certain pertinent data to ‗train‘ 
themselves by way of patterned-reinforcement learning.46  Just as sugar serves as the 
basic observational empirical data for the bacterium, for predictive patterning there 
exist protocol statements/propositions. With machine learning, the probability of 
any hypothesis is not determined a priori but determined by way of conditions and 
implementations. Similarly, for Simondon transduction is never exterior to the terms 
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that it brings forth, patterning through the inherent tensions in a domain (2020a: 
xxiii).47  
Often, the roots for this kind of paradigm are linked to Carnap‘s confirmation theory, 
which provides an outline of the acquisition of knowledge from experience. 
Specifically, in The Logical Structure of the World ([1928] 2003), Carnap defines an 
explicit computational procedure for extracting knowledge from elementary 
experiences. For Carnap, Simondon, and the kind of inferential machine learning 
logic that we are interested in—i.e., a Bayesian statistical logic that cannot be 
explained away with the extension of mind, intention, or memory, but navigates a 
differential space—objects deal with and restrict themselves to structural properties.48 
That is, objects are objects of form, where objectivity is structured by way of 
intersubjectivity, the dimensions of form structuring and holding together individual 
strands of content. As a consequence, the sole reason objects of knowledge are 
possible is because despite ‗the material of the individual streams of experience is 
complete diverging … certain structural features agree of all streams of experience 
… objects of knowledge are not content, but form, and they can be represented as 
structural entities‘ (Carnap, [1928] 2003: §66). This hierarchy allots deep and varied 
empirical Bayes in a prediction error landscape where prior probabilities are 
‗empirical‘ in that they are learned and pulled down from higher levels, such that they 
do not have to be extracted de novo from the any current input. In terms of a 
bidirectional multilevel hierarchy, the upper layers of the network form ‗top-down‘ 
predictions upon the basis of which data coming from levels below is assessed, 
where past certain thresholds of tolerance error signals ‗trickle up‘ in a feedforward 
manner, triggering the system to revise its predictive models. This reliance on higher 
levels means that processing at one level depends on processing at higher levels. 
Such priors are bifurcated into hyperparameters (re: expectations of means) and 
hyperpriors (re: expectations of precisions).49  
The pluralism of an open-ended form of practical reason is fundamental in this 
model of technical- /machine-communication insofar as it is reason-guided; a 
framework is not chosen by an individual but revealed preferences, a social process 
of some kind moving through a regulative ideal (Carus, 2017: 178). For Simondon, 
individuation has its own signal and signification, which are rendered functional to 
Media Theory 
Vol. 4 | No. 1 | 2020 http://mediatheoryjournal.org/ 
   
 
120 
 
the being‘s relation with its environment. How, then, do we go from here to (object-
)language? First and foremost, we have to consider the operative importance for this 
process of selection by way of intensity or degrees, which allows for the distinction 
of further definition(s) by way of signification. Machine language depends on specific 
individuation. This same process is the case with logic or any formal mode of 
thought, but this occurs in opposite fashion. Concepts arise by way of a specific 
interaction with formal language and any specific process of individuation gives 
origin to concepts, which are useful for coping with a specific environment: 
 ‗[t]echnical ensembles are characterized by the fact that in them a 
relation between technical objects takes shape at the level of the margin 
of indeterminacy of each technical object‘s way of functioning. This 
relation between technical objects is of a problematic type, insofar as it 
puts indeterminacies into correlation, and for this reason it cannot be 
taken on by the objects themselves; it cannot be calculated, nor be the 
result of a calculation; it must be thought, posed as a problem by a living 
being and for a living being‘ (Carus, 2017: 157). 
Simondon‘s idea of indetermination corresponds to our previous discussion of 
potential and prediction-error. For Simondon, any individuated being has a functional 
relationship with its environment whereby its relation(s) can change. This indeterminacy 
means that change/becoming in technical objects cannot be tied down to a doctrine 
of representation/the image; for Simondon, the concept of information is important 
for any ‗calculating machine‘ because calculations cannot observationally ‗feel 
through‘ the environment (much like the aforementioned bacterium), at least not by 
way of the same kind of sensorial feeling(s) that humans and most animals possess 
(using qualia/epiphenomena/sensa). Nonetheless, machines are sensible to 
information and this sensitivity is what Simondon is interested in via 
indetermination; for Simondon, communication, data, and information are all 
entangled in the world of actuality. Recall that, for Simondon, information is a 
general term for the intensities which cause reaction and affection; in computing 
machines, this is a process of information coming into a coupling with respect to the 
machine, causing it to act or react in some way. Similarly, Carnap‘s conceptual 
engineering of constructivism is anti-representationalist, as the fruitfulness of a 
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concept motivates its adoption into certain contexts where said application had not 
previously been used. While we will not be following Carnap into the woods of 
symbolic logic, the bridge between Simondon and Carnap has been constructed 
simply to assert that, in addition to evincing a picture of second-order cybernetics—
invoking principles of autopoiesis by challenging Wiener‘s conception of information 
and homeostasis—Simondon‘s conception of individuation by way of transduction 
(like Carnap‘s problematization of inductive logic) deals with real relations between 
individuals. Unlike Stiegler, who does not work with any measure of measurable loss in 
his cynicism towards digital networks (for Stiegler, ‗neganthropy‘ corresponds to an 
idealist noesis), Simondon‘s concretization—the engine of individuation—asserts 
that we are interested in specific results, which can only be understood by way of a 
system‘s changes (and, invariably, its equilibrium).  
 
From Second-Order Systems to Deep Learning 
Let us now turn to the final section of our study—deep learning through the 
Simondonian schema of technics, individuation, and concretization. A particularly 
pertinent approach to understand the higher-order representational abilities of 
sentient and sapient cognitive behavior is the predictive processing paradigm 
(hereafter: PP), which explains how cognitive systems generate ‗representations‘ of 
various phenomena on the basis of incoming information by way of a procedure 
called ‗prediction error minimization‘ (Hohwy, 2013). Parsing deep learning by way 
of Anil K. Seth‘s Bayesian modelling of the cybernetic brain and his work on PP, we 
shall endeavor through some of Simondon‘s work on ecologies of influence, with a 
particular interest in objects (esp. networked digital media objects vide computation), 
infrastructural operations, and formal planes of reference.  
According to certain cultural commentators, the epochal cultural development of 
‗deep learning‘ invokes a shift from linear Cartesian thinking towards intentional 
obfuscatory ‗black box‘ de-spatialisation. Frank Pasquale remarks that, rather than 
intelligibility, fields such as ‗actuarial finance‘—increasingly privy to high-speed 
trading via AI —cultivate a sense of ‗secrecy‘, establishing a barrier between ‗hidden 
content‘ and penetrability, where the former is associated with the machine‘s and 
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machine learning‘s top-down mereological parsing of Big Data sets and unauthorized 
access to its endogenous encoding on behalf of the ‗user‘ (Pasquale, 2016: 16). 
Similarly, Cathy O‘Neil likens data-based mathematical complex computation to 
‗Gods‘—impenetrable and ‗opaque, their workings invisible to all but the highest 
priests in their domain: mathematicians and computer scientists‘ (O‘Neil, 2017: 3).50  
Broadly speaking, Big Data and its computational methods have bolstered the long-
term construction of our datafied algorithmic reality; the future implications are 
drastic, with implications including predictive policing, hiring practices, credit 
assessment, and criminal justice. Thanks to the widespread cast of today‘s digital 
networks and the resulting availability of metadata and data we see why the neural 
metaphor that was once popular with early cybernetics researchers may make sense 
to invoke once more.51 Like the connective conditioning of synaptic connections 
between neurons that have previously fired together,52 Big Data allows for activity-
dependent plasticity where causal lines are quickly cemented and, subsequently, 
capitalized upon by marketing campaigns. Jointed research in reinforcement learning 
has also resulted in a milestone for AI research. Using the logics of Hebbian 
associative learning and Monte Carlo ‗tree-search‘ algorithms,53 ‗deep learning‘ and its 
Generative Adversarial Networks are predicated upon a scaffold that probabilistically 
retrofits output; that is, given samples are drawn from two competing models 
fighting against each other, with a generative model capturing data distribution and a 
(competing) discriminative model distinguishing training samples while, 
simultaneously, generating fake data samples. Given large sets of sampling data, 
training data has likewise burgeoned, resulting in the strengthened self-reinforcing 
process that Bernhard Rieder calls ‗computerization‘, 54  thrusting deep learning 
research into celestial zenith. 
The ‗Monte Carlo‘ framework is deserving of closer examination. Christened ‗Monte 
Carlo‘ after the gambling mecca, this analytical calculating method (developed during 
and shortly after WWII) utilizes simulative recall-and-precision while implementing 
random numbers (a la roulette) so as to simulate stochastic processes that had, until 
that point, been too complex to calculate. As an early example of analytical 
virtualization (and, arguably, virtual reality) the Monte Carlo method ‗came to 
constitute an alternative reality—in some cases a preferred one—on which 
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‗experimentation‘ could be conducted‘ (Galison, 1996: 119) By modeling a sequence 
of random scattering on a computer, the Monte Carlo sampling method ushered in a 
new epistemological plane for extracting information from physical measurements 
and equations. Its scheme of representation presupposes an ecology composed of 
discrete entities that interact through irreducibly stochastic processes. The Monte 
Carlo method, borrowing from both experimental and theoretical domains, 
negotiates the traditional categories of experimentation and theory; Peter Galison 
identifies this shift in the calculating machine as a development from ‗computer-as-
tool to computer-as-nature‘ (1996: 121). 
Such technological changes, ushering in epistemic evolutions, necessitate paradigm 
shifts in how we understand technicity; this is a specific feature inherent to 
Simondon‘s concept of concretization, the engine of conceptual technicity which 
attunes network objects to the sensitivity of local circumstances. Previous to Monte 
Carlo and neural networks was von Neumann architecture—von Neumann‘s work 
on infinite random generators allowed for the sequential repetition of a finite cycle of 
numbers ad infinitum within a finite machine. Instead of treating cognition (esp. 
memory and intention) as a process that is extended by and through technical 
systems, convoluted neural nets constitutively ‗remodel‘ themselves iteratively and 
reactively, proffering unique outputs which human players have, so far, been unable 
to predict. AlphaGo Zero, the Google DeepMind neural network that recently 
defeated the world‘s highest-ranking Go player, Ke Jie, and 18-time world Go 
champion Lee Sedol, is perhaps the most celebrated example. AlphaGo Zero‘s 
novelty is a byproduct of using the aheuristic ‗tree search‘ pattern recognition, 55 
simulation, and backpropagation to probabilistically account for simulative scenarios: 
by iteratively building partial search-inputs with which to update its ‗weights‘—or the 
default values of selection—such neural nets are able to start at a root node and 
recursively create non-terminal values that are revised according to 
‗backpropagation‘, or how simulated error scenarios unfold as a reactive gradient of 
layering. Multilayer ‗feedforward‘ neural networks such as AlphaGo are not only 
based on binary classification or principles of registration but on an ecology of data 
which is elliptically remodeled according to a hierarchical scaffold, constructing an 
evolutionary closed-loop evaluation mechanism that optimizes according to the 
current action in question.  
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Advances in Bayesian networks and statistics are inseparable from these 
developments. The Bayesian approach calculates probabilities for various hypotheses 
in terms of degrees of certainty and ‗is ideally suited for situations where one might 
want to begin calculating probabilities for different hypotheses (e.g., concerning class 
membership) even if very few observations are available, continuously updating and 
refining prior probabilities as more evidence comes in‘ (Rieder, 2020: 245). Bayesian 
networks are acyclical, directed graphs, illuminating model dependencies with nodes 
connected through the latticework of probabilities.56 In the case of machine learning, 
Bayesian classification allows for the capacity of algorithmic techniques that move 
between application domains where there are ‗habitats‘—data sets and classification 
characteristics—where one set of techniques burgeons and another diminishes. With 
deep neural networks, this involves modeling complex non-linear relationships 
between input-variables and output-classes distributing calculations over parallel 
hardware. This technique is i) perceptual, and ii) apperceptive: at once a model based 
on image-detection, the empirical frame of registration and recognition found in 
first-order cybernetics; but also dealing with internal-classification based on advanced 
graphics processing where the most salient features are weighted according to df-idf 
frequency.57  
This sets the stage for an epochal dilemma re: contemporary computation‘s internal 
logic. Were we to take syntax-based classical deductive computing, such as the 
Universal Turing Machine, as an ideal model (plucking neural nets from the mid-to-
late twentieth century), we could characterize the parsing of information as a linear 
spatial procedure—one composed of sifting through data by moving forward and 
backward as information is divided into procedural units and consequential steps. 
However, ‗deep learning‘ algorithms, as recently exemplified by advancements in 
reinforcement-learning AI (such as AlphaGo Zero), seem to ‗experience‘ data 
opportunistically. Such deep learning software are able to decisively re-integrate 
evaluative metrics that deviate from a sample-proportion.  
Sybille Krämer and Horst Bredekamp, describing contemporary advances in 
computation at the level of cultural techniques, remark upon the long-term effects of 
computerization, noting that:  
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…cultural techniques are promoting the achievements of intelligence 
through the senses and the externalizing operationalization of thought 
processes. Cognition does not remain locked up in any invisible 
interiority; on the contrary, intelligence and spirit advance to become a 
kind of distributive, and hence collective, phenomenon that is 
determined by the hands-on contact humans have with things and 
symbolic and technical artefacts‘ (2013: 26-27).  
Here, Krämer and Bredekamp describe calculus as a ‗mechanism of forgetting‘ (26), 
exacerbated by how computation implements operative signs and mathematical 
competence sans-reflection. The duo thus liken computation qua calculus to 
Stiegler‘s and Derrida‘s reification of the hypomnēmata; the two see the register of 
computation as externalizing cognition from the invisible interiority of the minds of 
individuals by way of distribution, shooting forth these grand prostheses which not 
only make perceptible that which was cognitively invisible but operationalize 
dissociation into previously unforeseen heights. Stiegler, Krämer, and Bredekamp 
recycle a pessimistic tale that ensnares the planetary apparatus of computational 
becoming where the sole means of recovery amounts to re-interiorizing that which 
has been computationally exteriorized. 58  Recall that the mission of Hegel‘s 
phenomenological propaedeutic investigation into the structure of thinking, raising it 
to the ideal of a ‗presuppositionless science‘, was to determine that even appeals to 
sensory immediacy at the ground of experience are always already mediated by the 
concept. But this concept finds a sea change in such thinkers of digitality, for whom 
a new concept of networked misfortune has taken anchor. 
Has the automation of intelligence left the biological human organism behind, with 
the human organism reduced to the reproductive organ of the machine phylum, thus 
fulfilling the role of a pollinator for machine reproduction? This fear far predates 
computerization. This is, in fact, what Samuel Butler, in his books Darwin among the 
Machines (1863) and Erewhon: or, Over the Range (1872), prognosticated with the 
intensive spatium of impersonally structured thought.59André Leroi-Gourhan carries 
such fears of the organized inorganic into the terrain of self-obsolescence in Gesture and 
Speech, foreseeing the biotic human as a fossil in the technosphere, with the human 
motor brain exteriorized in the last instance and, accordingly, captured by 
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autonomously locomoting robots, total mechanicity commemorating automation‘s 
final hour.60 Today, such fears of transhumanism run rampant haunt the popular 
imagination, the incubus of a fully automated future aggravated by conspiracies of 
synthetic pathogens and weaponized pandemics. Compounded with Pasquale‘s 
‗black-boxing‘, these fears paint a horror-stricken scenography of humans not only 
tethered to our machinic overlords but utterly unable to comprehend their masters‘ 
whims—outflanked and outpaced, a picture of man succumbing to ‗parasitism-as-
atrophy-of-individuation‘ (Moynihan, 2020: 85). Nonetheless, mustering philo-
sophical concepts alongside historical-archeological technical pursuits shows that 
such is not the case (at least not yet)—there is still a great deal of contingent 
genealogical residue between mankind and even the most advanced deep learning 
algorithmic logic.  
Functioning like brains, deep learning algorithms engage in predictive inference, 
working through the causes of sensory- or data-inputs by minimizing prediction-error(s). 
Anil K. Seth has been one of the foremost thinkers in philosophy of mind and 
researchers of PP to show how the predictive perception of sensorimotor 
contingencies originates not in the Helmholtzian principle of perception-as-
interference but in 20th century cybernetic principles that emphasize homeostasis and 
predictive control (i.e., second order cybernetics). Seth, drawing on Ashby‘s work on 
homeostasis, builds on the Law of Requisite Variety by arguing that the nature of a 
controller capable of suppressing perturbations imposed by an external system must 
instantiate a (virtual) model of that system. Interestingly, the paradigm of PP not only 
allots us with a description of algorithmic intelligence‘s patterning-based derivability 
but, in turn, how neuro-inferential mentality occurs by encoding such patterning. 
This Bayesian model of mind anchors rationality as a formal-computational 
reformulation of inductive reasoning, whereby cognition is a process of directing 
order out of noise. As Seth demonstrates, the PP paradigm proffers an analogy of 
mental ‗self-modeling‘ whereby the rational agent is denied epistemic access to how 
exteroceptive perception is patterned, as active inference involves source-detection 
and ‗seeking evidence that goes against current predictions, or that disambiguates 
multiple competing hypotheses‘ (Seth, 2016: 24). Neural network research has 
proven to illuminate great insights into how our own neural processes work, 
destabilizing the standard model that pairs ‗figurative projection‘ with 
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phenomenological centering. As Seth‘s research in phenomenal representation 
shows, the perceptual presence of disambiguation is one of counterfactually rich and 
relatively perspective-dependent integration.  
This gives us a spatial ecology of mind and perception. If, for instance, we take a 
tomato on a plate, the mental representation of the tomato is causally integrated via 
the plate‘s presence. Similarly, recalling Simondon and the bacterium, we can 
consider how the sugar-content is embedded in a functional field of engagement, a 
restricted environment. Such material-biological codetermination is the product of 
restricted horizons, where restrictedness decisively determines how sentient 
organisms are to be conceived of as ontological configurations (Puntel, 2008: 276). In 
both examples, causal contact with all other objects in the perceiver‘s vicinity 
informs the derivation of relevant information out of noise. Consequently, spatial 
perception is based on a kind of signal processing where ‗objecthood‘ is embedded 
within a causal ecology of spatio-temporal relativity. The tomato and the human 
perceiver are, in a sense, ‗flattened‘, with scalar inversion dependent upon relative 
ecological contingency—the tomato plays as much of a role as the plate does in 
distinguishing one object from another; this logic can be extended for objects that 
are less visually explicit, as their pertinent features are operative modal instruments 
nonetheless. As Reza Negarestani remarks, recalling the work of the late Carnap, 
such source detection is possible insofar as the estimates are probabilistically constrained 
such that they are hierarchically organized in order to track features at unique 
temporal and spatial scales that predict one another (Negarestani, 2018: 162-163). 
This is precisely the logic of unsupervised deep neural networks like Alpha-Go, 
which, engaging in iterative development through self-play, learn vide randomized 
training data, achieving stability by way of discerning operations into patterns of 
structure-preservation for the conceptual and formal dimensions guiding theoretical 
constructions. 
Coordinating itself to its environment, such a simulative system produces an ever-
more accurate ‗map‘ of the world to which it belongs. Source detection, in principle, 
is not simply circumscribed to the semblance of data but invokes complex theory-
forming systematizing conceptual abilities that theoretically map and intervene upon 
the world by plucking and hierarchizing features that are most pertinent. Perceivers 
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of red tomatoes, sugar-patterning bacterium, and sample-training deep neural 
networks similarly imbed the informational indexes that they register from the 
environment in a conceptual and formal theoretical context that makes explicit the 
objective modal structure of the world. In the case of deep learning this means that 
there is, beyond the ontological framework, also a more fundamental theoretical 
framework that becomes adaptively activated as, wittingly or not, the concepts that 
are at first solely granted theoretical use-value eventually acquire observational ones, 
without implying that the concepts designate or describe changes. To perceive 
something as something involves an active contribution by the thinking mind, through 
which agents extend their differential capacities (again: the concepts do not change) in 
relation to their environments, binding their labeling responses to sensory stimuli 
into counterfactually robust relations of incompatibility and consequence. Perceptual 
reports are non-inferentially prompted into epistemic challenges—observational 
concepts and perceptual reports are every bit as liable to assessment and revision as 
any theoretical concepts which have no perceptual uses but only inferential ones. 
And while observational concepts ‗ground‘ empirical knowledge insofar as they 
articulate conceptual responses to environmental inputs coming from sensation, this 
does not mean that those concepts are ‗Given‘ in the sense of foundational items of 
knowledge that are epistemically independent (Sellars, 1965).61 
This is one important tenet of the PP model‘s conceptual construction.62 It ought to 
be qualified by how it demonstrates the human unconscious‘ relative influence on 
bottom-up coding, thus summoning Kantian apperception.63 In fact, the PP model 
recalls several themes from Kant‘s work on mentality, emphasizing: the ‗top-down‘ 
generation of perception, the role of ‗hyperpriors‘, the function of ‗generative 
models‘, the process of ‗analysis-by-synthesis‘, and the crucial role of imagination in 
perception. Consequently, the PP paradigm echoes Kant‘s transcendental project as 
it explains how the mind tracks causal structure in the world through solely sensory 
data (Swanson, 2016). However, this approach emphasizes the global Euclidean 
structure, which, as Carnap‘s Der Raum (1922) demonstrates in its chapter(s) on 
mathematical space and physical space, can be amended to tie the Kantian 
conception of intuitive space to the methodological role of constituting the 
framework for spatial judgments in experience. According to Carnap, Kant was 
incorrect in thinking that three-dimensional Euclidean space is an a priori necessary 
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condition of the possibility of experience—while Kant was correct in regarding the 
experience-constituting function of space, this system needed to be generalized. 
Here, Carnap uncovers how the constitution of spatial structure serves as a condition 
for all possible object-experiences and, therefore, how this relational constitution 
informs intuitive space and its logic, shaping the conditions of all successive 
objective experience. Similarly, for Simondon relationality effectively has the value of 
truth and is key to knowledge, such that both the relation within the subject and the 
relation between the subject and the object obtain the value of reality. Thus, true 
knowledge is not a simple formal rapport between an object-substance and a subject-
substance but a relation between two relations, one of which is in the domain of the 
object and the other of which is in the domain of the subject; subject and object are, 
thus, understood by way of degrees of stability (Simondon: 2020a, 76).64 
For Carnap, the spatial system possessing experience-constituting significance, in 
place of that suggested by Kant, can be precisely specified as a topological intuitive space 
with indefinitely many dimensions. Thus, not only the attributes of the system but 
also that of its order-framework (i.e., corresponding formal space) are declared to be 
conditions of possibility insofar as object-experience is concerned. Here, every 
differential manifold is considered locally homeomorphic—local topological 
structures layer elements of perceptual experience uniquely, presenting them with 
necessary form independent of whatever freely chosen metrical stipulations are laid 
down by convention (Carnap calls these ‗optional determinations‘). This provides our 
perceptual experience with a structure of intuition in something akin to the original 
Kantian sense but is extended to ‗intuitive space‘. However, any ‗necessary form‘—
i.e., form necessary for ‗knowledge‘—is made intrinsically explicit in perceptual acts 
and representational systems. At the most general level, the way in which a 
representational system—including that possessed by humans, bacterium, deep 
learning systems—maps its environment depends on the structure of its ‗locators,‘ 
which define how a system discretizes data and conveys information relative to an 
address or coordinate system of variable dimensionality, where the latter specifies the 
number of parameters required for precise localization. Localization, equipollent to 
representation, works at the most fundamental level of empirical organization, as a 
system‘s coordination to its environment is characterized in terms of reliable 
differential responsive dispositions (Brandom, 2007: 653). Localization is therefore a 
Media Theory 
Vol. 4 | No. 1 | 2020 http://mediatheoryjournal.org/ 
   
 
130 
 
base-level ostensive operation which guides a system to navigate its environment and 
reliably track phenomena within it (Ladyman & Ross, 2007). Such causal regularities 
span the most fundamental kind of information-processing system, where variable 
inputs are systematically correlated with specific outputs, to those such as AlphaGo, 
which use simulative play and backpropagation. In a broad sense, one can say that 
such systems ‗classify‘ their environments by evincing such differential 
responsiveness, making patterns from updated forms; such patterns are not only a 
ubiquitous feature of the natural world but universal when engaging with and 
mending the world‘s objects, mediating them into media.  
Following this distinction between associative spatial stability qua differential 
relationality, we can challenge Kant‘s contention concerning the significance of space 
for experience via the three-dimensional Euclidean system and extend this to the 
probabilistic paradigm of cognition, which emphasizes pattern recognition. In the 
‗feedforward‘ neural networks that occupy our interest and Hansen‘s, alike, top-down 
signals instantiate a matrix of possible causal structure(s). Simultaneous to this top-
down generation of prediction is the bottom-up neural signal flow against which the 
predictions are matched—this is, therefore, termed the ‗recognition model‘. The PP 
paradigm emphasizes that the knowledge of how to generate patterns is actively used in 
order to recognize incoming patterns.65 As Andy Clark notes, ‗instead of attempting to 
directly train a (synthetic) neural network to classify images, the network first learns 
to generate such images for itself‘ (Clark, 2015: 27), not by simply checking them 
against a database of previously-encountered images but by identifying endogenous 
rules, or ‗imagination procedures‘, that the network utilizes to generate incoming 
stimuli for itself. This has become increasingly significant as we move away from the 
methodological aperture of recollective storage-and-retrieval modalities, or ‗token 
instances‘ (Lake et al., 2015), and conceive of deep learning algorithms that match 
human performance as differentially surjected, considering sensation and perception 
as complimentary twin concepts rather than processes that follow one another. Thus, 
‗perception would not exist without the differential utilization of sensation‘ and the 
apprehension of relational structures between objects (or between the body and 
objects), while the operation of sensory differentiation can only be coherent with 
itself if it is made compatible by another activity, the activity of integration by way of 
perception (Simondon, 2020a: 230). 
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For Kapp, Leroi-Gourhan, and Stiegler, externalization is accomplished by way of 
alienating and projecting some contingent thing (mind, memory, intentionality) out 
of the body: the movement of externalization mirrors the dialectical structure of 
Hegelian subjectivity and its transcendental origin. The ideality of any concept or 
representation is always seen as the negation of the immanent real and its sublation 
into a higher (that is, transcendent) level of abstraction. However, knowledge, itself, 
is not unmoored by way of novel automatisms of exteriorizing interiorization and 
outpouching informatic exchange as Stiegler would have us believe; knowledge, 
being differentially determined, is always subject to its ecology. Regardless of what 
language we use—whether it be Hansen‘s/Whitehead‘s, Simondon‘s, or Carnap‘s—
one point is clear when it comes to ‗feedforward‘ networks and deep learning: rather 
than a return to Kapp‘s ‗organ projection‘ where deep learning‘s nervous architecture 
and its sensory arrays are treated as an eversion of the human brain and its axonal 
synapses, networked into computerized threads, we must divaricate the procedural 
logic of the brain from its purported morphological export into the world of 
machines. Only then can we call ourselves responsible Prometheans and not 
despondent fatalists. 
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Notes 
 
1 Similarly, André Leroi-Gourhan remarks that ‗[t]he whole of our evolution has been oriented toward 
placing outside ourselves what in the rest of the animal world is achieved inside by species 
adaptation. The most striking material fact is certainly the ‗freeing‘ of tools, but the fundamental fact 
is really the freeing of the word and our unique ability to transfer our memory to a social organism 
outside ourselves‘ (Leroi-Gourhan, 1993: 235). Arnold Gehlen, in the same vein, also remarks that:  
Man is ultimately an anticipatory (vorsehend) being. Like Prometheus, he must direct his energies 
toward what is removed, what is not present in time, and space. Unlike animals, he lives for the 
future and not in the present. This disposition is one of the preconditions for an acting 
existence, and human consciousness must be understood from this point of view. Indeed, all the 
aspects of man, which should be kept in mind through the ensuing discussion, are actually 
elaborations of the basic characteristic of man—action. We shall see that many of the isolated 
statements about man are really developments of one basic point of view—that man represents 
Nature‘s experiment with an acting being (Gehlen [1940]: 1988: 24-26). 
2 Stiegler uses the term ‗noetic‘ to describe this rationality; the term comes from the Greek noesis and 
Aristotle‘s nous, referring to the mind and to the understanding or awareness, which conditions 
human rationality. 
3  Stiegler, recalling Gilles Deleuze‘s ‗Postscript to Societies of Control‘, often also remarks that 
technologies, analog and digital, are ‗pharmacological‘ or serve as ‗pharmakon‘, and thus are both 
poison and cure. Here, despite tracking in Derrida‘s lexicon (of the ‗pharmakon‘), Stiegler directly 
recalls Deleuze‘s work on ‗control societies‘ where Deleuze, remarking on novel technologies that 
diffuse the techniques of disciplinary society that Foucault identified, notes new possibilities of 
repression and possibility. In an interview with Antonio Negri titled ‗Control and Becoming‘, 
Deleuze notes that:  
The quest for ‗universals of communication‘ ought to make us shudder. It‘s true that, even 
before control societies are fully in place, forms of delinquency or resistance (two different 
things) are also appearing. Computer piracy and viruses, for example, will replace strikes and 
what the nineteenth century called ‗sabotage‘ (‗clogging‘ the machinery) (Deleuze, 1995: 175). 
Nonetheless, Stiegler‘s most recent publications, particularly The Age of Disruption (2019) and The 
Nanjing Lectures (2020), as well as his general identification of ‗tertiary retentions‘ with ‗disruption‘ 
and ‗entropy‘, make clear that he identifies the artefactual capture of the earth as liquidating 
something primordial. 
4 In an interview with Matthew Griffin and Susanne Herrmann, Kittler remarks that: 
That the media influence bodies through emergence and immersion, on that point we both 
agree. However, I don‘t believe in the old thesis that thus the media are protheses of the body, 
which amounts to saying, in the beginning was the body, then came the glasses, then suddenly 
television, and from the television, the computer. The mythology is that everything frees itself 
from the body, dissolves and submerges in it again, in the sense of emergence and immersion, 
virtual reality, cinemascope, and hallucination …. I think to be able to describe a general media 
history, it would be better to work, like Luhmann, systematically from the independent histories 
of the technological media. The media don‘t emerge from the human body, rather you have, for 
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example, the book, and the military generals in considering how they can subvert the book or the 
written word, come up with the telegraph, namely, the telegraph wire; and then to offset the 
military telegraph, they come up with the wireless radio, which Hitler builds into his tanks‘ (1996: 
739). 
Kittler rejected this ‗old thesis‘ that media function as prosthetic extensions of the human senses or 
of organs. In vigorously refusing this ‗old thesis‘, Kittler preferred a more interventive and a system-
theoretical relationship between media and organism, whereby tools establish culture. 
 
6 Similarly, Arnold Gehlen remarks: 
Given the obvious absence of specialization in human organs…, any theory that claims that man 
is directly descended from animals and that does not resort to a special supplemental hypothesis 
to account for this particular issue necessarily confronts the insurmountable problem of deriving 
primitive forms from developed ones (Gehlen, [1940] 1988: 80). 
7 This moment of anamnesis is the moment of recollection and, in the Meno, the slave boy‘s drawing in 
the sand of the gymnasium serves as hypomnēmata (the monument) for memory—a stand-in for the 
essence of true memory itself (mnēmē); the artificial apparatus in question, the inscription, is a 
monument (or artefact) as it makes memory technical and serves as a substitute for anamnesis, 
extending memory. For Stiegler, this recovery from anamnesis formats the techno-transcendental 
condition of the human experience of time by way of artefact-as-substitution. In the era of digitality, for 
Stiegler this has a particularly insidious nature: 
…as this apocalypticism without God that now haunts the entire world, given that since 2008 
the consumerist model, by collapsing, has made clear that it is no longer just the financial objects 
of logos, constituted by their hypomnēmata, which in the twentieth century changed their meaning 
and social function, but also everyday and familiar objects – and, along with them, and since they 
alone can definitively undermine the foundations, das Ding, the Thing (Stiegler, 2018: 73).  
For other philosophers such as David Chalmers and Andy Clark (and their theory of Extended 
Mind), digital technologies such as iPhones are normatively positive; the two point to how such 
technologies offer those suffering from neuro-degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer‘s the 
opportunity to offload memory onto devices/artefacts. According to Chalmers and Clark‘s Parity 
Principle, such external devices do not merely facilitate cognitive tasks but are in fact constitutive of 
those cognitive operations in question; cognitive states and processes extend beyond the brain and 
into the external world when those relevant parts of the world function in the same way as do 
unquestionably cognitive processes in the mind (Chalmers and Clark, 1998; Clark in Chalmers, 2008: 
ix). That is, a notebook or smartphone can be understood as cognitively constitutive if and only if 
someone consults it for directions where they would have otherwise had to consult their 
memory/memorize these directions. In this sense, Chalmers and Clark approach digital technologies 
with a more fine-tuned and function-oriented interest in mentality, rather than ascribing to the 
wholesale cynicism of Stiegler. 
8 Stiegler clearly co-opts Derrida‘s rendering of Plato (made obvious by Stiegler‘s use of the term 
pharmakon), which sees hypomnesis as a derided category and mechanical reproduction as normatively 
negative; Derrida writes in Plato’s Pharmacy that ‗[t]he sophist thus sells the signs and insignia of 
science: not memory itself (mnēmē), only monuments (hypomnēmata), inventories, archives, citations, 
copies, accounts, tales, lists, notes, duplicates, chronicles, genealogies, references. Not memory but 
memorials‘ (1981: 107). Writing, as a dialectical simulacrum of ‗true science‘, becomes a pharmakon.  
9 Stiegler most often uses the term ‗exosomatization‘, which is a holdover from Lotka. 
10 Marshall McLuhan‘s oft-quoted apothegm, ‗the media is the message‘ offers a cruder version of the 
same argument; while McLuhan is not a ‗philosopher‘, it would not be wholly inappropriate to count 
him as a member within these ranks.  
11 Specifically, Canguilhem referred to it as ‗general organology‘. 
12 David Bates writes that ‗…cybernetics as a transdisciplinary science had its very origin in the insight 
that pathological physiological performances could be mapped, structurally, onto technological 
failures with mathematically identical characteristics. While Wiener and his colleague Julian Bigelow 
discovered that excessive compensation could lead to increasing oscillations that eventually became 
uncontrollable, leading to great disorder and a failure to find equilibrium‘ (2014: 33-34). 
13 By ‗life‘ Canguilhem has in mind something akin to Henri Bergson‘s conception of élan vital, such 
that biology is vital, pre-existing the body or the mechanistic thinking of it. In turn, Canguilhem‘s 
‗general organology‘ allows the body to be understood as a machine, or in mechanist fashion, but 
asserts that there is a more primary biological primer which escapes this description:  
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If vitalism translates a permanent exigency of life within the living, mechanism translates a 
permanent attitude of the living human toward life. Man is here a living being separated from life 
by science and attempting to rejoin life through science. If vitalism, being an exigency, is vague 
and unformulated, mechanism, being a method, is strict and imperious (Canguilhem, 2008: 62). 
14 For Leroi-Gourhan, technologies externalize memory in addition to liberating organs. 
15 According to Kapp, technologies (specifically, tools) externalize the body‘s organs; for Kapp, there 
is a morphological linkage between the organs inside one‘s body and the tools mankind crafts. 
16 Kapp writes that: 
As the human being makes use of the objects ‗at hand‘ in its immediate vicinity, the first tools 
appear as extending, strengthening, and intensifying the human being‘s bodily organs. If, 
therefore, the natural hammer is the forearm with clenched fist, perhaps reinforced by a stone 
clasped in the hand, then the stone attached to a wooden shaft is its simplest artefactual after-
image. For the shaft or the handle is an extension of the arm, the stone a replacement for the 
fist. Our reflections are limited here to a selection of figures belonging to the group of hammers, 
axes, and their nearest forms from the Stone Age, on the basis of their illustrative significance 
(Kapp, 2018: 36). 
17 Marx roots this in human social relations, which become objectified via commodities. Feuerbach 
sees this as within the ambit of human self-consciousness and Marx sees this as human practice (i.e., 
social production). 
18 Stiegler defies Hegel here by retaining the notion of a looming pre-existing external substance and 
identifying technical with outpouching some original and vital source, such that Spirit is something 
that has to be reclaimed. He uses the term ―negentropy‖ to articulate this but, given the term‘s 
origination in thermodynamics, where it has a very specific meaning, we will avoid using Stiegler‘s 
term. More broadly, this paper seeks to strike a secondary concern: Stiegler is not only a traitor to 
Simondon but also to Hegel, despite following from a Hegelian lineage of philosophers of 
technology. 
19 For Hegel, ‗[t]he concept is free because the identity that exists in and for itself and constitutes the 
necessity of substance exists at the same time as sublated or as positedness, and this positedness, as 
self-referring, is that very identity‘ (Hegel, 2010: 513).  
20 One could also see the Hegelian Master-Slave dialect as a prosthetic relationship. For the master, 
the slave serves as the site of veridiction, speaking ‗truth‘ only via instruments of veridiction (i.e., 
instruments of truth-expelling, instruments of torture). Here, the conception of political power is 
conceived of as pure affect; the master constitutes himself as self through the virtual embodiment 
and the disembodiment of slave in imposing the will. The slave thus serves as an archive for the 
master ,as the slave‘s body functions as a memory substitute (hypomnēmata)—the archival prosthetic, 
a supplement and archive of power (esp. Foucauldian power, where power is understood as a site-
specific space of contingency by way of spatialization). One could also further note, recalling the 
mirror-stage in psychoanalysis, that the Hegelian master seeks recognition from slave, constituting 
himself by turning the slave into as mirror-device for master and, thus, further engaging in 
artefaction/prostheticizing the slave. 
21 For Hegel, the acting self and absolute spirit come into synthesis for in human expressions such as 
but not limited to art, religion, and philosophy. For Kapp, tools and instruments allow for such 
human expressions to actualize into becoming. 
22 For Brassier, this is a mistake: there is no self-relation uncontaminated by estrangement and only 
retrospectively through history can we discern between what compels us to be free and alienation. 
The estrangement of history is what befalls us and thus prevents us from being in complete 
possession of us. 
23 One of the most apparent weaknesses of this rendering is that, as a consequence, metalanguage is 
not foundational for spoken language but simply understood as a technic proper once it is 
externalized. Consider Stiegler‘s following remark: 
Today, Chomsky […] distinguishes innate language, which he also calls private language, or I-
language (for ‗internalized language‘), from cultural languages, E-language (for ‗externalized 
language‘). This kind of notion is what leads Jerry Fodor to refer to what he calls ‗mentalese‘. 
And it is a catastrophe […] I myself consider that language, just like writing, involves a recoding 
of prelinguistic cerebral functions (communicational and cognitive—for example, categorization 
functions), but that language nevertheless did not exist prior to this recoding. As for ‗private 
language‘, it is an internalization by psychic individuation along a circuit of transindividuation 
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that is originally social [….] The writing of which Wolf speaks is a more advanced form of that 
placing into exteriority that lies at the origin of language—an advanced form that changes 
language itself. But this is possible only because language is an originally social system founded 
on the artificial organ that the ‗word‘ already is. (Stiegler, 2020: 218). 
Stiegler thinks that the distinction between private and external language is ‗catastrophic‘ because 
sociality precedes any idea of internalization. Yet, ‗mentalese‘, or the language of thought, is never 
independent from socialization in its acquisition. Stiegler conflates the conditions for genesis of 
language with the conditions of its reproduction, as if Fodor thought that one could learn 
‗mentalese‘ in a vacuum. Stiegler is seemingly taking issue with the fact that ‗mentalese‘ expressions 
are analogs of sentences and the syntax of spoken languages, claiming that Fodor takes what is a 
social artefact as a natural kind (i.e., the word). For Fodor, however, thought precedes spoken 
language and is not prior to thought. Thought is more primitive than discursive cognition and has a 
syntactical structure which mirrors some formal languages and much of natural languages. Stiegler, 
in, subordinating psychic individuation to techno-social individuation, unwittingly ignores the 
discursive experience of giving and asking for reasons in language games.  
24 The Nanjing Lectures (2020) were published after The Age of Disruption (2019), but the former are 
comprised of a series of lectures given between 2016-2019.  
25 Stiegler terms this process of losing access to the knowledge that allows us to exist as rational agents 
collaborating and self-organizing from our labor (‗savoir faire‘) as ‗proletarianization‘, which results 
in us becoming dependent on consumption and compensation to have a meaningful life (‗savoir 
vivre‘). 
26 While Hansen talks about Google PageRank and data analytics companies, he does not actually 
parse the protocols in question nor their training logic.  
27 Throughout his literature, Stiegler speaks of ‗retentions‘, whereby ‗primary retentions‘ are sense 
perceptions, ‗secondary retentions‘ are memories, and ‗tertiary retentions‘ are media (culture 
mnemonics, which are further bifurcated into ‗analog tertiary retentions‘ and ‗digital tertiary 
retentions‘). Stiegler, however, does not give us a theory or logic of complexity, such that we do not 
know when or what makes a media ‗digital‘ in comparison to the ‗analog‘. This is rather 
determinantal to his system, as Stiegler subordinates psychic individuation to techno-social 
individuation, and, therefore, ‗secondary retentions‘ (memory) to ‗tertiary retentions‘ (artefacts). 
Other philosophers, such as Reza Negarestani, have remarked upon the how iterative computational 
construction is inherent to digitization, where digitality is a byproduct of deletion that is followed by 
generative supplementation. That is, digitality asserts its own logic of discrete systems that engage in 
Negarestani recalls that the domain of the digital is that of mechanizability, realized by deletion: 
‗discrete inputs, discrete states, and discrete outputs‘, whereby ‗what is erased […] has to be replaced 
by new supplements—every figure loses something but also is supplemented with new lines and 
diagrammatic configurations [….] the shift from the analogue to the digital should be regarded as a 
veritable worldmaking. In this process, continuities are deleted‘ (Negarestani, 2018: 430). Rather 
than understanding ‗the digital‘ as merely electronic machines and networks, as Stiegler seems to 
indicate, Negarestani (as well as others such as Alan Turing and Giuseppe Longo) have defined it as 
a system which reproduces itself/its rules and can be amended functionally, such that any in-world 
encoding has a system-wide effect, which ends with homeostasis. 
28  Heidegger, along with Derrida, is a primary philosophical influence for Stiegler (in treating 
technology as an epistemological rupture). 
29 Such relational study is central to Heidegger and his enumeration of technical objects such as the 
tractor in the field or the hut in the Black Forest. 
30 Hart, a computer scientist, was an acquaintance of Simondon who wrote the preface for Ninian 
Mellamphy‘s previous unofficial translation. 
31 For Graham Harman, the Heideggerian disposition in which objects withdraw from our epistemic 
and practical grasp serves as an ideal model for the noninteraction of all objects with one another in 
zero-sum terms. Harman‘s typology of change is directed towards functional ends, with an object 
either acting towards or against the system‘s end. Contra Simondon, for Harman ‗vicarious 
causation‘ bars direct influence between entities/manifest qualities. For Harman alteration is a zero-
sum game of drastic transformation or gridlock, after which change is barred. Therefore, Harman‘s 
necessitarian conception of stochastic transformation is accompanied by a subsequent non-initial 
theory of immunity. Harman‘s ontological argument for change maintains that change is only 
possible in a finite number of occasions and, in such instances, transpires in an extreme sense 
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(Harman, 2012: 171-206). ‗Thing Theory‘ co-opts a similar, albeit something more sundry, 
conception of tools and machines.  
32 ‗Reticulation‘, as opposed to ‗networked‘, captures the concentric form that relations of differential 
influence take. 
33 For Simondon, invention is key, as it will serve as the socio-political beacon for his conception of the 
man-machine relationship; Simondon ultimately seeks to demonstrate how we can achieve a 
relationship that goes beyond the terms of Marxist alienation. In re-inscribing the technicity of 
knowledge, it is, for Simondon, the purview of philosophical thought to see the formation of a 
becoming-aware that builds upon the modalities of aesthetic thought, which allows for a mediated 
relationship between technical objects and their function. 
34  According to neuro-inferential models such as Predictive Processing, ‗best‘ predictions are 
understood as those which enable control and homeostasis under a broad repertoire of 
perturbations, underscoring the functional boundary between controller and environment. 
35 Jean Piaget is a common point of reference for many second-order cyberneticists and Simondon. 
Remarking upon radical constructivism and radical constructivists, von Glasersfeld notes that:  
They have taken seriously the revolutionary attitude pioneered in the 1930s by Jean Piaget, the 
Swiss founder of cognitive psychology. This attitude is characterized by the deliberate 
redefinition of the concept of knowledge as an adaptive function. In simple words, this means 
that the results of our cognitive efforts have the purpose of helping us to cope in the world of 
our experience, rather than the traditional goal of furnishing an ‗objective‘ representation of a 
world as it might ‗exist‘ apart from us and our experience (1991: xiv). 
36 Here, in addition to Norbert Wiener, Simondon is referring to Claude Shannon, Ralph Hartley, and 
Ronald Fisher (whose surname he spells as ‗Fischer‘). There does seem to be an inaccurate 
conflation at play here as, for Wiener, information is a measure of degree re: organization in 
opposition to entropy (where entropy measures degree of disorganization; that is, for Wiener 
information is negentropic). For Shannon, information is the measure of degree of incertitude, or 
redundancy. 
37  Here, Puntel deals with moving from intelligibility as the fundamental immanent structural 
characteristic of the dimension of Being by enumerating on the universal coherence of the dimension of 
Being (where coherence deals with positive interconnections/systematicity) and universal coherence as 
universal structuration. For our purposes, we apply this structuration to Simondon‘s conception of 
communication and individuation. 
38  For example, given the history of evolution, Simondon describes evolution as a process of 
individuation; however, he is not interested in offering/adding a supplementary history of 
evolution—with Deleuze, the virtual is the potential of not simply one unique process (despite this 
process is, according to Deleuze, the process of ‗becoming‘) but a process of actualizing various 
different processes. Of course, Simondon is an extremely critical source for Deleuze, but Simondon 
more directly informs when and how Deleuze describes actual processes—how beings co-hold or 
modify themselves as part of a machinic ontology, or how beings-cum-machines modify their 
reciprocal relations as they co-determine themselves. 
39 Simondon‘s notion of a pure genetic field tracks with William James‘ radical empiricism, where the 
world of pure experience is a world without subject or object (Henri Bergson has a similar 
conception of the field of pure experience). It is on this plane that, for James, division takes place 
and distinctions may be constructed. The plane/world of pure experiences is, for James, how the 
neutral point of the present is constructed. For Simondon and James, the instant field of the present 
is always experience in a ‗pure‘ state, where the point of pure present whose thought does not 
belong to consciousness is separated from consciousness. Similarly, C.S. Peirce‘s classification of 
signs which only makes sense in light of semiosis, the function that the sign may perform; just as 
forms are always derived from a function that produces them, the signification of the sign is tied to 
the action of the sign. 
40 As readers of Deleuze may note, this will be most important for Deleuze‘s project. Deleuze—
throughout his oeuvre—rigorously attempts to avoid the priority of forms/concepts over reality 
(contra Platonist internalism). Deleuze‘s project is committed to demonstrating how concepts are 
created and produced with respect to processes of individuation which occur in reality. For both 
Simondon and Deleuze, there are no a priori concepts which are imposed onto matter that are used 
to order or create order but, instead, concepts emerge as a consequence of differentiation of matter. 
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41  This is a dialectic only in the formal sense, but it does not move through historical stable 
oppositional positedness. 
42  The process that Deleuze calls ‗differenciation‘ roughly corresponds to Simondon‘s 
individualization; both are working against the Aristotelean model of ‗potentiality‘ as for both, actual 
difference has a ‗creative capacity‘ of its own, which Aristotle‘s conception of ‗potentiality‘ does not; 
differenciation in Deleuze and individuation in Simondon is physical, corresponding to a 
distribution of singular and remarkable points. As Ray Brassier remarks, these points: 
become incarnated in a physical partition or a biological specification. Individuating difference is 
‗the disparate‘ or the dark precursor as differenciator of difference; the disparate generated by 
‗the disparity‘ of intensive difference. Ultimately then, individuation determines actualization, 
which unfolds according to the fork in being between expressing thought and expressed Idea. 
This fork is a function of the nature of intensity as enveloping and enveloped (Brassier, 2007: 
174). 
Alain Badiou describes differenciation vs. differentiation by noting that:  
[w]hereas differentiation determines the virtual content of the Idea as problem, differenciation 
expresses the actualisation of this virtual and the constitution of solutions (by local 
integrations)….Differentiation itself already has two aspects of its own, corresponding to the 
varieties of relations and to the singular points dependent upon the values of each variety. 
However, differenciation in turn has two aspects, one concerning the qualities or diverse species 
which actualise the varieties, the other concerning number or the distinct parts actualising the 
singular points. For example, genes as a system of differential relations are incarnated at once 
both in a species and in the organic parts of which it is composed (Badiou, 2000: 110). 
Differenciation, like actualization, deals with discontinuous spatial structures; the differentiated 
problematic structure, different in kind to differenciated solutions, constitutes the domain of the actual. 
The genesis of determinable ideas, moving from differentiated to differenciated, from problem to 
solution, therefore moves from the virtual to the actual. One of Simondon‘s main influences on 
Deleuze is in distinguishing concrete actualizations of ‗Ideas‘ by way of a distinction that makes and 
can be determined as difference (of difference). 
43 As readers of Deleuze may note, Deleuze‘s project is very compatible with Simondon‘s here, for 
Deleuze shows how concepts emerge within such a process of becoming—within this process of 
individuation. However, one point of distinction is critical: for Deleuze, the virtual is much more 
akin to Bergsonian virtuality—the virtual as a kind of past in its being a condition of a process (it is 
the past of a process, a condition or the being of a condition outside time). The virtual in Deleuze is 
an atemporal condition of a temporal process; this is why it is called Aion, or the time of eternity. In 
Simondon, there is no such conception of the virtual. Although Simondon engages with vitalism to 
some extent, recalling Bergson when he speaks of ‗potential energy‘ and ‗actual energy‘ (for instance, 
in his detailed study of transducers), this strategic implementation is more so in order to describe 
how there is homeostatic modulation in energy transference with such machines (e.g., Ashby‘s 
homeostat). There is no reason we cannot do away with Bergson‘s vitalism and codify Simondon‘s 
description of thermodynamic or homeostatic machines‘ moving from one state of constrained 
equilibrium to another via external manipulations.  
44 Note: although he does not rely upon it and only mentions it once, Simondon does recall Kapp‘s 
gesture when he states that ‗for the tool is an extension of the organ, and it is carried by gesture‘ 
(2017: 130). Nonetheless, rather than tracing a biotic-morphological schema between the tool and 
the organ (as is the case with Kapp) Simondon‘s interest is more so in the organ as part of a 
complex system of organizations and this is not how he sees the machine. For Simondon science 
must be constructed on ‗energetics and not just on a morphology‘ (2020a: 696). Elsewhere, 
Simondon makes a distinction between tool/instrument and machine:  
the tool is at once tool and instrument, which is to say a means of action prolonging the organs 
and a channel of recurring information. The machine, on the contrary, as a complete closed 
individual, replacing man, generally has no system of self-regulation: it goes through the motions 
of stereotypy of successive gestures according to a predetermined conditioning. The first type of 
machine is what one could call a mechanical being without self-regulation. It is indeed a practical 
technical unit, but not a technical individual strictly speaking (2017: 139).  
Note: in this remark re: the machine without self-regulation, Simondon has in mind Wiener‘s 
conception of the machine-as-automata (without reference to interiority/autopoiesis).  
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45 The heuristic in question is a perfect knowledge of the game‘s (i.e., Go‘s) rules; as we will further 
detail, the ‗Monte Carlo‘ tree search algorithm (the ‗engine‘ of AlphaGo Zero, allowing for rapid-
action value estimation) does not need a supplementary heuristic function (there is no need for 
domain-specific knowledge). 
46 Interoceptive predictive coding‘s inference similarly utilizes prediction-error. This description is 
viable for homeostatic behavioral systems writ large. Consider how:  
blood sugar levels (an essential variable) fall towards or beyond viability thresholds, reaching 
unexpected and undesirable values …. Under interoceptive inference, the following responses 
ensue. First, interoceptive prediction error signals update top-down expectations, leading to 
subjective experiences of hunger or thirst (for sugary things). Because these feeling states are 
themselves surprising (and non-viable) in the long run, they signal prediction errors at 
hierarchically-higher levels, where predictive models integrate multimodal interoceptive and 
exteroceptive signals. These models instantiate predictions of temporal sequences of matched 
exteroceptive and interoceptive inputs, which flow down through the hierarchy. The resulting 
cascade of prediction errors can then be resolved either through autonomic control, in order to 
metabolize bodily fat stores (active inference), or through allostatic actions involving the external 
environment (i.e., finding and eating sugary things) (Seth, 2015: 24). 
47 Simondon‘s ‗transduction‘ is:  
in contrast with induction and deduction, which do not have the status of being but are strictly 
logical relations exterior to the preexisting terms that they link up....an individualizing movement 
of knowledge, but also a movement of being, transduction is a form-taking in conjunction with 
the energetic discharge of the metastable system that is revealed as being more than unity and 
more than identity (2020a: xxiii). 
48 Given that Carnap and Simondon share an epistemological program of empiricism—where both 
philosophers‘ empiricism passes through a rationalist bottleneck (with Carnap‘s rationalist program 
transpiring towards the end of his career), the fact that we can construct a bricolage by way of 
emphasis on the structural descriptions of our knowledge and objects vide their environment should 
serve as no surprise. Simondon upholds an objective structure, but solely as this pre-individuated 
objectivity is constituted by way of the transformation of structures; in the last instance, Simondon‘s 
philosophy leans toward experience, knowledge, and the concrete. Much like Simondon‘s rejection 
of that which is absolutely true, preferring that which is instrumentally true (i.e., solving a specific 
problem), we have a similar idea in the Carnap of 1963, wherein the ‗conception of the tools we use 
to choose tools are chosen in the same way and with the same tools that we use for object-level 
choices among goods or bets‘ (Carus, 2017: 167). Undoubtedly, however, Simondon is more 
sympathetic to metaphysics than Carnap. 
49 As Link Swanson remarks: 
The top-down signals instantiate a generative model—a matrix of possible causal structure—
which ‗predicts‘ the causes of current sensations as it flows downward along the ‗backwards‘ or 
‗feedback‘ anatomical neural pathways. Simultaneous with this top-down generation of 
predictions is a bottom-up neural signal flow against which the predictions are ‗matched‘ or 
‗checked‘ (sometimes called a ‗recognition model‘) and which flows along the ‗feedforward‘ 
neural connections. (Swanson, 216: 7). 
50 In Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (2018), Yuval Harari uses the term dataism to describe the 
phenomenon of data-fetishism/fundamentalism, where data processing systems take on the 
theological effects of blind worship. 
51 As Andrew Pickering details in his book, The Cybernetic Brain (2010), the idea of the cybernetic 
machine was shaped after the adaptive theory of the brain. This was particularly the case with firs-
order cybernetics, with researchers designating the function of the brain organ as not a 
representation of but a means to understand processes of adaptation to the external environment. 
Understanding deep learning not only as a machine of cognition but one that operates with a logic 
similar to synaptic processes serves as highly valuable in understanding predictive patterning. 
52 Hebbian learning is an example of reciprocal modulation regulated by functional activity; here the 
synaptic connections formulate over time and are a byproduct of how the strength between two 
neurons increases if their activity is correlated (and decreases if it is uncorrelated; Hebb‘s law is often 
summarized with the adage: ‗neurons that fire together wire together‘). 
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53 AlphaGo Zero utilizes deep neural networks and heuristic search algorithms, specifically the ‗Monte 
Carlo‘ tree search for searching through its strategic space when making decisions re: choice of play; 
AlphaGo Zero operates as a tabula rasa, and has been touted as ‗superhuman‘. Notably, it is: 
…trained solely by self-play reinforcement learning, starting from random play, without any 
supervision or use of human data. Second, it uses only the black and white stones from the 
board as input features. Third, it uses a single neural network, rather than separate policy and 
value networks. Finally, it uses a simpler tree search that relies upon this single neural network to 
evaluate positions and sample moves, without performing any Monte Carlo rollouts. To achieve 
these results, we introduce a new reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates lookahead 
search inside the training loop, resulting in rapid improvement and precise and stable learning 
(Silver, 2017: 354). 
The ‗Monte Carlo rollout‘ (also called ‗simulation‘) in question refers to the phase in which random 
actions are taken by the network to retrieve a landing state before another random action is taken in 
order to land in a new state. This process is iterated until a terminal state is reached. The terminal 
state contains a result (value) that is seeded upwards into the backpropagation phase, which updates 
the previous nodes by adding this result to their value, increasing the count of visits at each node. 
Such is the iterative relationship between selection and expansion in deep learning. The Monte Carlo 
tree search is crucial to such deep neural networks, providing sufficient numbers of parameters for 
algorithms likes AlphaGo to conduct complex computations with (and, according to some, 
surpassing) human-level intelligence on specific tasks. This is achieved by its reduction and learning 
capacities in decision spaces and searching processes. Given our Simondonian frame, we ought not 
to overlook how critical the CPU and GPU are with large-scale parallel computing.  
54 Bernhard Rieder remarks that ‗…computerization rather than datafication emphasizes that data 
accumulation enables forms of ‗immediate‘ management that operate through interface modulation. 
The direct application of algorithmic ordering is made possible by the emergence of digital 
infrastructures and environments that allow for both data collection and output generation in the 
sense that the structure and content of what appears on a screen or some other interface can be 
compiled in real time on the basis of data that may have been collected over extended periods of 
time‘ (2020: 36-37). ‗Computerization‘ as such reifies Simondon‘s conception of technics, treating 
algorithmic information-ordering as inseparable from principles of design/architecture. Similarly, we 
ought to not neglect the social imperatives born out of social media platform capitalism. Given 
Rieder‘s fondness for Simondon, his attentiveness to such facets should serve as no surprise. 
55 Apart from game rules and conditions, the ‗Monte Carlo‘ tree search algorithm (which consists of 
four phases: Selection, Expansion, Rollout/Simulation, Backpropagation) does not need any 
previous informational inputs such as strategy or tactics. 
56 Rieder details the example of spam filtering where ‗building its model from the very first classified 
email and every additional act of labeling will produce an imprint while leaving room for future 
adaptation‘ (2020: 245). 
57 This is done by way of tf-idf (term frequency-inverse document frequency) where the frequency of 
a term in a document and its rarity in the collection are used to calculate its weight, which orders 
information according to statistical specificity by calculating feature distribution over a full collection 
of data, weighting different features to identify and project statistical horizons. Such term-weighting 
schemes add discriminatory power to information-and-retrieval modalities.  
58 Stiegler notes how ‗… a new social hierarchy could be constructed, based on a new stage of 
exosomatization, characterized in particular by the re-interiorization of exosomatic organs‘ (2020: 
314). 
59 Butler remarks that: 
Is it not plain that the machines are gaining ground upon us, when we reflect on the increasing 
number of those who are bound down to them as slaves, and of those who devote their whole 
souls to the advancement of the mechanical kingdom? […] what an army of servants do the 
machines thus employ! Are there not probably more men engaged in tending machinery than in 
tending men? Do not machines eat as it were by mannery? Are we not ourselves creating our 
successors in the supremacy of the earth? (Butler, 1872: 201). 
60 For Leroi-Gourhan: 
Mechanical automation, from the mechanical brontosaurus of the nineteenth century rolling mill 
to the automatic pilot of today, represents the penultimate possible stage of the process begun 
by the Australanthrope armed with a chopper. The freeing of the areas of the motor cortex of 
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the bram, definitively accomplished with erect posture, will be complete when we succeed in 
exteriorizing the human motor brain. Beyond that, hardly anything more can be imagined other 
than the exteriorization of intellectual thought through the development of machines capable 
not only of exercising judgment (that stage is already here) but also of injecting affectivity into 
their judgment, taking sides, waxing enthusiastic, or being plunged into despair at the immensity 
of their task. Once Homo sapiens had equipped such machines with the mechanical ability to 
reproduce themselves, there would be nothing left for the human to do but withdraw into the 
paleontological twilight. (Leroi-Gourhan, 1993: 248) 
61 In the sense that they could be had without having another concept, or that they are self-justified in 
the sense that they could yield knowledge irrespective of other claims within an inferential procedure 
in which they play a part as premises or inferences for theoretical reasoning (Sacilotto, 2020: 150). 
62 We have detailed the PP model with great conceptual care, particularly with close regard to how 
training and empirical data are involved because, aside from Bernhard Rieder‘s Engines of Order 
(2020), media theory/archeology has not yet adequately dealt with training data, probabilities, and 
Bayesian epistemologies. 
63 For Kant, apperception corresponds to spatialized representation and is part of a tripartite mold 
consisting of: i) the apprehension of unity (simple intuition); ii) reproduction of unity in the 
imagination (distinction and juxtaposition); iii) summation, by which the self represents to itself a 
multiplicity in space. 
64 Simondon has a surprisingly similar critique of the Kantian a priori to Carnap: 
…we cannot deduce as definitively as Kant a relativism of the existence of a priori forms of 
sensibility. If noumena are indeed not pure substance but also consist of relations (like exchanges 
of energy or passages of structures from one domain of reality to another domain of reality), and 
if relation has the same status of reality as the terms themselves, as we have tried to show in the preceding 
examples—insofar as relation is not an accident relative to a substance but a constitutive, energetic and 
structural condition that is extended in the existence of constituted beings—then the a priori forms of 
sensibility that allow us to grasp relations because they are a power of organizing according to 
succession or according to simultaneity do not create an irremediable relativity of knowledge 
(Simondon, 2020a: 75-76). 
65 Hansen‘s analysis of feedforward loops that mediate the data of causal efficacy via relativity takes a 
similar approach to the topic of subjectivity and media-operationalization. Hansen terms ‗desire‘ 
what we have ascribed via pattern-recognition vide PP (Hansen‘s project is more 
phenomenologically cultivated and centers around ‗data of sensibility‘). Regardless of terminology, 
both frameworks show how the operation of speculation is brought into experience, dealing with 
deliberate decisions-making techniques. Hansen achieves this through Whitehead‘s account of 
process:  
Like Whitehead‘s account of the incessant oscillation between concrescence and transition, every 
act of accessing the data of sensibility is itself a process that creates new sensibilities— 
sensibilities that are, in turn, added into the extant data of sensibility. This process of data 
propagation of sensibility perfectly captures the way that potentiality (Whitehead‘s ‗real 
potentiality‘) correlates with the superjective dimension of process: far from being an inert 
source for computation, as it is often understood to be, data is quite literally teeming with 
potentiality, and specifically, with potentiality that—though part of the settled world—has a 
speculative relation to experience understood as the experience of consciousness. That is why, as 
we shall see shortly, data-mining and data analytics do not simply calculate a preexistent space of 
possibilities, but literally create new relations and thus new information (new data) as a result of 
their operation (Hansen, 2015: 142).  
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